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FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION,
AND ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

Daniel C. Richman
Much of the literatureon federal criminal law bemoans the extent to which
Congress has abdicated its legislative responsibilities and left enforcement decisions to prosecutorialdiscretion. Many critics have sought to compensate for the
absence of appropriate legislative specificity by proposing other devices for limiting prosecutorial power, many of which would centralize enforcer authority.
Guided by recent work in positive political theory, Professor Daniel Richman
argues that such claims of legislative abdication overlook the attention that Congress has given to the organization and activities of the federal enforcement
bureaucracy. By showing the extent to which Congress balances concern with
enforcer accountability against suspicion of presidentialpower, the Article cautions against reform proposals that would undermine considered political decisions about the allocation of criminal enforcement authority.
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the common critique of substantive federal criminal
law has been simple but quite devastating. Seduced by the desire to be seen
as tough on crime, senators and representatives have engaged in an orgy of
ill-considered or unconsidered lawmaking. Giving little thought to the
sheer breadth of conduct ostensibly criminalized by their enactments, or the
degree to which they were intruding into areas reserved by tradition (even
constitutional mandate) to state and local law enforcement authorities,
legislators have all but abdicated the responsibility for deciding what
conduct really ought to be prosecuted, and prosecuted federally. The
consequence of this legislative failure has been to transfer effective criminal
lawmaking power to politically unaccountable prosecutors and, on occasion, to judges willing to set some constitutional or statutory limits on
prosecutorial discretion.
Spurred by this critique, critics have long sought to compensate for the
absence of appropriate legislative specificity-in both federal and state
criminal statutes'-by looking for other devices for limiting prosecutorial
power. Some have called for courts to be more receptive to selective prosecution challenges or more aggressive in applying the "rule of lenity."2 Others, like Kenneth Culp Davis,3 have looked to the administrative process
and have called for the government to make prosecutorial decision making
more centralized, and perhaps more accountable, through the promulgation
of limiting guidelines. Recently, Dan Kahan combined these approaches in
a provocative proposal that would enlist the rule of lenity as a means of
promoting centralized prosecutorial decision making Although the proposals for reform vary, they share a common premise: Because the legislative
branch has fallen down on its obligation to specify what conduct should
really be prosecuted, the other branches must take that responsibility, and
do so in a way that maximizes democratic accountability.
Rather than enter the debate about how best to compensate for Congress's abdication of its criminal legislative responsibility, this Article
questions the common premise on which that debate is based. On its face,
1. This critique has hardly been limited to federal criminal lawmaking. See, e.g., Frank J.
Remington & Victor G.Rosenblum, The Criminal Law and the Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F.
481, 483-89. The focus of this Article, however, is on the federal system.
2. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (noting that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity"); see also Reno v.
Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995).
3.

KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).

4. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469, 469 (1996).
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substantive federal criminal law unquestionably delegates a staggering
degree of discretionary authority to federal prosecutors. As positive political theorists have argued in other areas, however, the nature and extent of
any such delegation cannot be assessed simply by reference to the specificity
of substantive lawmaking (or the lack thereof). Indeed, a central theme of
this literature has been Congress's sophistication in designing mechanisms
to control bureaucratic drift in the wake of broad delegations to administrative agencies.' To what extent has Congress deployed such mechanisms in
the fragmented and complex federal law enforcement bureaucracy? To
what extent does the very design of that bureaucracy reflect gatekeeping
strategies that legislators have selected in lieu of legislative specificity? By
beginning to answer these questions, this Article provides a far richer
account of Congress's role in constraining prosecutorial discretion than has
hitherto been recognized and recasts the debate about political accountability in federal criminal law enforcement. Although much more empirical work must be done before the account offered in this Article can
be deemed anything more than impressionistic and tentative, it rings far
truer than the theories that currently dominate the literature.
Part I briefly examines the breadth of prosecutorial discretion ostensibly permitted by substantive federal criminal law. Part II then reviews some
of the standard theories that have been, or might be, offered to explain why
Congress has been willing to delegate this extent of effective lawmaking
authority to prosecutors. Provisionally assuming that legislators would not
be deaf to the interests of a wide array of national interest groups potentially
affected by prosecutorial choices, this part explores whether these interests
might be served by a legislative strategy of maximal delegation to the executive. Once the peculiar, fragmented design of the federal enforcement
bureaucracy is considered, however, this account lacks plausibility, except
in the limited context of federal-state relations.
Part III shows that delegation strategies do indeed emerge, not in
Congress's substantive lawmaking, but in its interactions with, and manipulation of, the federal enforcement bureaucracy. Through an examination of the mechanisms that Congress uses to constrain prosecutorial
discretion without relying on legislative specificity, this part demonstrates
that Congress is far more ready to limit enforcement authority in certain
areas than the substantive law seems to suggest. In other areas, however,
the dominant congressional strategy appears to be defensive-not an
assertion of policy preferences, but an effort to limit presidential power.
5. See Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War
over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671, 671-72 (1992).
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The Conclusion suggests how this model of legislative activity should influence our view of proposals to restrain prosecutors.
I.

THE BREADTH OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW

Assessing statutory breadth can be difficult. Federal criminal law certainly reaches a broad range of conduct. Whether it exceeds some optimal
degree of criminalization, however, is an issue on which there is little consensus, and on which, as Bill Stuntz has noted, the courts have regrettably
refused to give constitutional guidance.6 In search of another metric, one
can ask whether federal criminal legislation is broader than federal statutes
in other areas. This does not seem to be the case, given the wholesale delegations that Congress has made to administrative agencies, allowing the
effective creation of federal common law in areas of labor law, antitrust,
securities, and the like. To be sure, there are powerful arguments, based on
the peculiar nature of criminal law, for demanding far more legislative
specificity in penal statutes than we tolerate in legislation in other areas.'
Aside from these normative concerns, however, the extent of delegated
enforcement authority in the criminal area is not particularly remarkable in
our bureaucratic state.
It is similarly hard to determine whether federal criminal legislation is
broader than state criminal legislation. Jerry Lynch has noted that federal
criminal law "has been less influenced by academic codifiers than the laws
of the states."' One might also argue that Congress has gone out of its way
to cut federal legislation loose from the common-law moorings that tend to
limit the effective scope of state provisions But it is well-nigh impossible
6.
See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedureand Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J.
1, 66-76 (1997); see also Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269 (1998).
7. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Constructionof Penal Statutes,
71 VA. L.REV. 189, 244-45 (1985); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994
SuP. CT. REV. 345,353.
8.
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2137 (1998).
9.
This is, at least, what the Supreme Court has often found. See, e.g., Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 261 (1992) (stating that, in the Hobbs Act, Congress "unquestionably
expanded the common-law definition of extortion to include acts by private individuals pursuant
to which property is obtained by means of force, fear, or threats"); Moskal v. United States, 498
U.S. 103, 109-11 (1990) (finding that the meaning of prohibition on trafficking in fraudulent
securities is not constrained by common law); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 45 (1979)
(concluding that references to "bribery" in the Travel Act go beyond common-law definition);
Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1896) (rejecting a claim that the mail fraud
statute could reach only cases that at common law would have been characterized as involving
"false pretenses").
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to say whether the range of conduct potentially covered by federal law is
greater than that reached by state penal laws.
Is federal criminal law broad not merely in the scope of the conduct
that it criminalizes, but also in the degree to which it intrudes into areas
that traditionally have been considered the sole province of state and local
penal law enforcement? Answering this question requires a vision of how
federal power can, as a constitutional matter, or should, as a policy matter,
be deployed-an issue on which many reasonable minds differ."0
This much is clear though: Although the absolute or relative degree of
breadth is quite difficult to prove, let alone quantify, anyone with more
than a passing familiarity with federal criminal law is struck by the extraordinary extent to which Congress has eschewed legislative specificity in this
highly sensitive area." The result, intended or otherwise, has been to
transfer a considerable degree of lawmaking authority to the other branches
of government. In other areas, such as federal securities, labor, or antitrust
law, we are often told that Congress has effectively permitted the courts to
engage in common-law legislation. 2 Although the Supreme Court has studiously denied that federal common-law crimes exist, l" some savvy skeptics
have observed that the courts have been allowed the same authority in the
criminal area as well. 4
10.
Compare Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal
Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1165-74 (1995), and Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 652-68 (1997), and Roger J. Miner, Crime and
Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 681, 681 (1992), with Jamie S. Gorelick &
Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization Debate, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 972
(1995) (arguing for broad concurrent jurisdiction for state and federal enforcers, Justice Department officials note that, even when an area is "appropriate for state regulation," a particular case
can "call[] out for federal prosecution, which cannot be achieved without a grant of federal criminal jurisdiction"), and Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, The Underfederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 247, 277-311 (1997).
See, e.g., FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF LEGALITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE
11.
RULE OF LAW 77-93 (1996).

12.
See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, In Praiseof Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, in
BENCHMARKS 155, 185-95 (1967); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12
PACE L. REV. 263, 287-90 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (1985).

13.
See United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1226 n.6 (1997) ("Federal crimes are
defined by Congress, not the courts .... ); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980)
("[W]ithin our federal constitutional framework .... the power to define criminal offenses and to
prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the
Congress."); United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
14.
See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Statutes like the Sherman Act, the civil rights legislation, and the mail fraud statute were written in broad general language on the understanding that [they are] implicit delegations of
authority to the courts to fill in the gaps in the common-law tradition of case-by-case
adjudication."); United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 24 (2d Cir. 1983) (Winter, J., dissenting in
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The judiciary is hardly the only branch so empowered. As Kahan has
noted, "federal prosecutors, too, end up with a significant share of delegated
lawmaking authority."' 5 Kahan gives two reasons for this accretion of power.
The first is that "prosecutors enjoy the power of initiative," the ability to
decide which statutory interpretations to urge, and' the ability to select
which cases to use "as vehicles for novel statutory readings."' 6 The second
is "the stubborn persistence of the principal-agent conception of interpretation," which makes courts chary of narrowing the scope of broadly worded
statutes and "empowers individual prosecutors, who face no check in
advancing exceedingly broad statutory readings."' 7
If anything, Kahan underestimates the extent to which the executive
exercises effective lawmaking power because he does not consider how
prosecutors can prevent the judiciary from ever passing on the statutory
interpretations on which they rely. With very limited ability to discover
the precise contours of the government's case, 8 federal criminal defendants
generally cannot seek the equivalent of summary judgment. Unless the
government's pretrial filings specify its theory of the case with reasonable
specificity-which they seldom do-the only way a defendant can challenge the prosecution's statutory interpretation is to go to trial.' 9 Yet the
cost and, more importantly, the risk of greater sentence that trials entail"
will generally deter defendants from exercising this option.2' Indeed, even
part and concurring in part) ("If judges perceive a need for a catch-all federal common law crime,
the issue should be addressed explicitly with some recognition of the dangers, rather than continue an inexorable expansion of the mail and wire fraud statutes under the pretense of merely
discharging Congress' will."); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 142-44 (2d Cit. 1982)
(Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Kahan, supra note 4, at 472-79.
15.
Kahan, supra note 4, at 479.
16.
Id. at 479-80; see William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, ProsecutorialDiscretion, and
the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 678, 702 (1982) (noting the
same phenomenon in the antitrust area).
17.
Kahan, supra note 4, at 480-81.
18.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 844 (2d ed.
1992) ("The Federal Rules model ... provides the standard for the narrowest range of prosecution
disclosure ....).
19.
See, e.g., United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Unless the
government has made what can fairly be described as a full proffer of the evidence it intends to
present at trial to satisfy the jurisdictional element of the offense, the sufficiency of the evidence is
not appropriately addressed on a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment.").
20.
See U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES: A REPORT
ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN
SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA
BARGAINING 77-81 (1991) (stating that defendants who plead guilty are likely to receive lower
sentences under the guidelines).
21.
During fiscal year 1996, of the 53,172 defendants who were either acquitted or convicted in federal district court (i.e., whose cases were not dismissed), 48,196 (91%) were convicted
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the defendant who is fully able to articulate a pretrial challenge to the government's theory will frequently give up the chance to do so in exchange
for sentencing leniency." Congress's creation (or approval) of a sentencing
scheme that puts such a high premium on prosecutorial favor 3 has thus
contributed significantly to the movement of effective lawmaking authority
from the courts to the executive branch.
The next question is whether the extraordinary degree of discretionary
authority that Congress appears to have given to federal enforcers represents a conscious delegation of power. There is no simple answer. The
ostensible breadth of many statutes often may just be intentional vagueness
or ambiguity-born of legislators' interest in avoiding difficult drafting
issues24 and their recognition of the opportunity costs of specificity in this
area. One might also argue that the breadth of federal criminal law owes
far less to legislative choices than to creative judicial interpretations,
spurred on by prosecutors careful to choose the right cases to advance their
agendas. 6 After all, one of the broadest statutes, the mail fraud statute,
dates from 1872 and has been used to cover conduct that its drafters

upon pleas of either guilty or noo contendere. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1996, at 448 tbl.5.27 (1997).
22.
See, e.g., David M. Brodsky, Think Before You Shred That Document, N.Y.L.J., July 6,
1998, at 9, 11 (noting that the propriety of unprecedented use of a federal misprison statute
against a corporation-in a case in which Daiwa Bank allegedly failed to alert authorities immediately upon learning of an employee's crimes-was never addressed by the courts because the company pleaded guilty).
23.
See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1471, 1475 (1993).
24.
See CHARLES R. WISE, THE DYNAMICS OF LEGISLATION: LEADERSHIP AND POLICY
CHANGE IN THE CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS 178 (1991); Remington & Rosenblum, supra note 1,

at 487. Frank Remington and Victor Rosenblum concluded that legislatures probably
are not greatly dissatisfied with the way the ambiguous criminal statutes are being
administered in practice and the advantage of flexibility may well outweigh the desire for
clarity and certainty, particularly when the achievement of these may require the legislature to face up to issues which it would rather not confront.
Remington & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 487.
25.
See Kahan, supra note 4, at 475 ("Tlime spent enacting criminal legislation necessarily
comes at the expense of time that could be spent enacting legislation sought by small, highly
organized interest groups, which are more likely than the public at large to reward legislators for
benefits conferred and to punish them for disabilities imposed.").
26.
See ALLEN, supra note 11, at 72 ("In some areas of legislation, like the federal Mail
Fraud and Wire Fraud Acts, the present meanings ascribed to the statutes are largely the products
of prosecutorial initiatives."); Kahan, supra note 4, at 480 ("By paying close attention to the facts

of the cases they select as vehicles for novel statutory readings, federal prosecutors can highlight
the benefits and suppress the costs of the interpretations that they favor.").
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could not possibly have envisioned." Perhaps that statute was hijacked by
prosecutors.
The story of congressional activity in this area undoubtedly contains
all these elements. However, it is also a story of purposeful efforts to
expand the scope of the executive's discretionary enforcement power. The
conversation between Congress and the courts 28 is a peculiar one: Expansive
statutory interpretations will generally be greeted with silence or, sometimes, ratification.29 But should the Supreme Court, or even a lower court,
significantly restrict the breadth of a criminal provision, Congress will
frequently intervene to override the decision." Evidence of ratification can
also be found in Congress's readiness to extend the range of two of the most
flexible prosecutorial workhorses-the mail fraud statute and the Hobbs
Act-by making them predicates for money laundering and RICO prosecutions,"' or in legislation increasing the penalties in the criminal civil rights
statutes after judicial decisions have extended their reach.2 Even when
27.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Hush!: The Criminal Status of Confidential Information After
McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121
(1988); Daniel J. Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative Approach, 20 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 423, 424 (1983) (stating that the statute "has been expansively interpreted to
invite federal prosecution of virtually every type of untoward activity known to man"); Jed S.
Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771 (1980); Gregory Howard
Williams, Good Government by ProsecutorialDecree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. L.
REV. 137 (1990); Todd E. Molz, Comment, The Mail Fraud Statute: An Argument for Repeal by
Implication, 64 U. CHI. L.REV. 983, 983 (1997).
28.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REV. 26, 62-65 (1994) (discussing how judicial interpretation of statutes can respond to
postenactment legislative signaling).
29.
See, e.g., Offenses Against the Postal Service § 215, 35 Star. 1123, 1130 (1909) (former 18 U.S.C. § 338 (1940)) (ratifying Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896)); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a) (1994) (ratifying Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983), with an amendment).
30.
See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VII, § 7603(a), 102
Star. 4181, 4508 (1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1346) (passed in the wake of McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)); Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L.No. 105-35, 111
Star. 1104 (1997) (passed in wake of United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1077 (1st Cir.
1997), which rejected the use of the computer and mail fraud statutes against an IRS employee
who abused his access to taxpayer records); False Statements of Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-292 § 2, 110 Star. 3459 (1996) (responding to Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695
(1995)); Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. IV, § 411, 108
Stat. 2160, 2243, 2253 (1994) (amendment to 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) designed to overrule Ratzlafv.
United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994)); cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 359 (1991) ("Congress will generally not
override a Supreme Court decision without painstaking deliberation over whether the decision
undermines its policies and whether alternative approaches are desirable.").
31.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1961-1963.
32.
See United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1226 n.6 (1997) (noting the lower court's
conclusion that Congress never intended 18 U.S.C. § 242 "to extend to 'newly-created constitutional rights,' ... is belied by the fact that Congress has increased the penalties for the
section's violation several times ... without contracting its substantive scope").
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Congress passes a criminal statute that narrowly addresses conduct hitherto
prosecuted under a broader statute, it will not preclude prosecutors from
exercising the discretion to invoke the harsher penalties of the broader
statute." The availability of such choices not only enhances the ability of
prosecutors to obtain guilty pleas, but also suggests a conscious legislative
tolerance for the scope of the broader provisions.
When we combine the breadth of federal criminal legislation with the
relatively small size of the federal enforcement apparatus and the absence of
any Continental "principle of legality" that would compel enforcement in
any particular case,34 we are left with what appears (at least at first glance)
to be a world of virtually unfettered executive discretion.3 ' This is the
world condemned so strongly by observers like Francis A. Allen:
The purpose of crime definition is not simply to facilitate the
unleashing of governmental powers against persons and groups but
also, at the same time, to make evident the behaviors that are
immune from the onerous intrusions of the state. It is this central
and elementary definitional obligation that is increasingly neglected
in the lawmaking of American legislatures and courts.36
It is not too hard to figure out why federal enforcers might like this
state of affairs. With maximal jurisdiction but limited resources, they have
the best of both worlds. Their resource limitations generally allow them to

33.
See Molz, supra note 27, at 986 (arguing for the rule of repeal by implication). The
rule that Congress does not repeal the more general statute by implication in this case is not
simply a judicial creation. During Prohibition, the Supreme Court interpreted the Volsted Act as
setting up a comprehensive enforcement scheme that precluded prosecutions under the more
general, and harsher, revenue laws of conduct covered by the act. Congress acted within a month
and soon thereafter produced a statute effectively overruling the decision and reinstating a regime
in which prosecutors could freely choose which statute to invoke. See KENNETH M. MURCHISON,
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCTRINES: THE FORGOTTEN INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL PROHIBITION

132 (1994).
34.
See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 194 ("Whenever the evidence that the defendant has
committed a serious crime is reasonably clear and the law is not in doubt, the German prosecutor,
unlike the American prosecutor, is without discretionary power to withhold prosecution." (footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted)); see also John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion
in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 455-67 (1974); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial
Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of
Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1332-34 (1993).
35.
See Lynn N. Hughes, Don't Make a Federal Case Out of It: The Constitution and the
Nationalizationof Crime, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 161 (1997) (observing that "[tihe most forceful,
unchecked power in America is prosecutorial discretion," a federal judge urges that "[wle need to
limit the range and number of laws a prosecutor has to use").
36.
ALLEN, supra note 11, at 91; see Williams, supra note 27, at 149 ("Allowing federal
prosecutors unfettered discretion to expand the meaning of fraud under the mail fraud statute
clearly violates the principle of legality.").
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avoid taking responsibility for crime on any particular "beat,"37 but, at the
same time, they can be confident that they will have a criminal statute to
fit any antisocial conduct they choose to pursue (with "antisocial" defined
fairly broadly). As James Q. Wilson found:
An FBI agent's workload.., is.not determined by objective circumstances over which he has no control, such as the number of crimes
reported to the Bureau by citizens, but by organizational policies and
the incentives operating on the agent. His workload consists of
those cases that Bureau policy requires him to accept or those cases
that, within Bureau guidelines, he has chosen to accept.38

When, for example, the Justice Department and the FBI, sensitive to the
post-Watergate "crises of confidence,"3 decided to make white-collar crime
a priority in the mid-1970s, they did not need Congress to pass any new
laws; the necessary statutes had long been in place."
Enforcement chiefs have worked hard to maintain this balance
between authority and responsibility. Even as the federal government
began to take on a large criminal enforcement role with Prohibition,
Attorney General Mitchell, who later opposed passage of the federal kidnapping statute in the wake of the Lindburgh case, was careful to point out
that
[dlealing with organized crime ... is largely a local problem ....
[Tihe
fact that these criminal gangs incidentally violate some federal
statute does not place the primary duty and responsibility of punishing them upon the Federal Government, and until state police and

magistrates, stimulated by public opinion, take hold of this problem,
it will not be solved. 1

37.
Some beats are associated with federal enforcers: securities violations, immigration,
international drug smuggling, counterfeiting, federal tax offenses, espionage, and terrorism are
only a few. But prosecutions in these areas are only a fraction of the narcotics, fraud, firearms,
theft, and racketeering cases brought by the Department of Justice each year. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 21, at 420 tbl.5.5; see also JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND NARCOTICS AGENTS 25 (1978) ("The reason for the [FBI's]
relative scarcity of individual complainants is that, in almost every criminal matter, the FBI shares
jurisdiction with local police authorities, and it is to these authorities that citizens first turn when
they have been raped, assaulted, robbed, burgled, or had their cars stolen.").
38.
WILSON, supra note 37, at 29; see also id. at 165 (referring to a study finding that "when
confronted with a choice, many if not most bureaus prefer greater autonomy to greater resources").
39.
Tony G. Poveda, White-Collar Crime and the Justice Department: The Institutionalization
of a Concept, 17 CRIME, L.& SOC. CHANGE 235,246 (1992).
40. See id. at 236 ("[Wjhat was involved in the process [of targeting white-collar crime] was
not the passage of a law by a legislative body ....but rather the social construction of an entire
crime category by an executive agency using existing statutes.").
41.
HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE
HISTORY OFJUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 478 (1937).
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J. Edgar Hoover fended off many congressional efforts to increase the FBI's
jurisdiction and regularly decried anything that looked like an effort to
create a "national police force."42 More recently, the current FBI Director,
Louis Freeh, successfully opposed an amendment to the 1994 Crime Bill,
offered by Senator Alphonse D'Amato, that would have made almost every
state crime committed with a gun a federal offense. 3 If the dominant
theme of this century has been the expansion of federal jurisdiction, an
important subtheme has been the efforts of federal enforcers to limit expectations of federal power. They have been largely successful in these efforts
and in ensuring that federal criminal statutes are seen, not as legislatively
imposed enforcement programs, but as grants of discretionary authority.44
The harder question is why Congress tolerates this state of affairs. The
situation becomes even more curious when viewed in the broader context
of administrative law. The criminal area is hardly the only one in which
Congress finds itself forced to delegate policy making and enforcement discretion to bureaucrats who may have their own personal or political agendas. What sets this area apart, however, is that Congress cannot use many
of the tools for monitoring and managing delegated criminal enforcement
authority that it can draw on to constrain bureaucratic discretion in other
areas.
Leading positive political theorists, writing under the name
"McNollgast," have, for example, suggested how elected public officials can
use administrative process to ensure that bureaucrats comply with their
policy intentions." By tinkering with standing rules and other aspects of
the procedures for challenging administrative actions, Congress can "reduce
the informational costs of following agency activities and especially facilitate
'fire-alarm' monitoring through constituencies affected by an agency's
policies. 46 McNollgast may have overestimated the efficacy of administrative procedure as a means of political control, or at least the extent to

42.
SANFORDJ. UNGAR, FBI 79 (1976).
43.
See Brickey, supra note 10, at 1169 n.183.
44.
See Gorelick & Litman, supra note 10, at 973. Justice Department officials have argued
that Congress should criminalize conduct "even though it intends the jurisdiction it authorizes to
be exercised in only a small percentage of cases. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion, then,
becomes the most important and effective brake on the federalization of crime." Id.
See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
45.
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 243 (1987) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Administrative Pro-

cedures]; see also Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing BureaucraticAccountability, 57
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics

and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
440-44 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Structure and Process].
46.
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 45, at 273.
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which it has been used for this purpose.47 However, one thing is clear: This
tool cannot be (or at least has not been) used to control criminal law
enforcers. On those occasions when the Justice Department promulgates
prosecution guidelines, there is no formal rule-making process. In the
adjudicatory context, affected parties lack the standing, and therefore the
incentive, to contest failures to prosecute." And even when the government does prosecute a defendant, he will have very few legal avenues to
pursue a claim that law enforcement officials abused their discretion. 9
Moreover, while in other areas Congress's broad delegations are really conditional, in the sense that it retains power to review and override an agency
decision if it so desires,"0 Congress cannot, as a practical matter, undo
criminal adjudications."1 Congress will find it quite difficult to undo even
expansive statutory interpretations because of the political infeasibility of
protecting those individuals previously identified as criminals.
At first blush, the extent of Congress's abdication of its lawmaking
responsibilities in the criminal area thus seems astounding, and well
47.
See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE
TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 123-30 (1997) (questioning the empirical basis of the McNollgast
theory).
48.
See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617-19 (1973); see also Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 378-79 (2d Cir. 1973). In administrative law,
an agency's refusal to initiate an enforcement proceeding is presumptively unreviewable, but that
presumption can be rebutted when the substantive statute provides guidelines for the agency's
exercise of enforcement powers. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985); see also
Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975) (upholding review of the secretary of labor's
refusal to challenge a union election when the underlying statute had ordered the secretary to
bring suit if there was probable cause to believe that a violation had occurred).
49.
See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-68 (1996); Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-10 (1985); Anne Bowen Poulin, ProsecutorialDiscretion and Selective
Prosecution: Enforcing Protection After United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071,
1088-108 (1997).
50.
See John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 1, 8 (1990).
51.
As a theoretical matter, Congress may well have the power to confer amnesty on a
convicted offender. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L.REV. 275, 283-84 & n.41 (1989) (citing Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591, 601 (1896)).
52.
See Carol A. Bergman, The Politics of Federal Sentencing on Cocaine, 10 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 196, 197-98 (1998) ("The importance of appearing harsh on crime cannot be
over-estimated in a tough race .... Most Members of Congress are only too aware that any
action-especially a vote-which can be used against them in campaign advertisements usually
will be.").
A rare instance in which Congress has rolled back a criminal provision-the 1981 Firearms
Owners Protection Act, which weakened provisions covering firearms trafficking-is the sort of
exception that proves the rule, evidence of the exceptional power of the gun lobby. See WILLIAM
J. VIZZARD, IN THE CROSS FIRE: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO AND FIREARMS 92 (1997).
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deserving of critics' condemnation.53 The usefulness of positive political
theory, however, does not end once one recognizes that the Administrative
Procedure Act does not limit the law enforcement bureaucracy. The theory, which derives its insights by presuming that institutional actors act
rationally in a manner calculated to advance their policy preferences,"
demands that we probe beyond the face of the substantive law and ask some
basic questions: First, what might explain legislators' willingness to write
such broad statutes in an area in which notice is so important, penalties
so severe, and conduct so easily chilled? Second, to what extent do legislators rely on means other than substantive law to constrain enforcement,
and, third, to what ends do they use these means? Logically, these basic
questions of political economy ought to be answered before one proceeds to
a fourth inquiry that presumes the suboptimality of the existing dynamic
and asks what doctrines or institutional reforms should be implemented to
change it.

The focus of most commentary, however, has been on the last of these
questions. The range of solutions suggested has been broad and of varying
effectiveness. Many involve recruiting the courts to hold Congress's feet to
the fire. While doctrines like void-for-vagueness and the rule of lenity can
be quite malleable, they still might be invoked to bar prosecutions that
Congress did not clearly authorize, thus depriving the legislation of the
benefits of intentional ambiguity and vagueness." Courts might also use
principles of federalism, embodied either in constitutional restrictions on
federal power 6 or in rules of statutory interpretation," to ensure that Congress turned square corners before authorizing federal enforcers to venture
53.
See Remington & Rosenblum, supra note 1, at 481 ("The dominant view of criminallaw specialists has been that the legislature should assume major responsibility for making basic
policy decisions in the field of criminal law.").
54.
See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 462 (1992) (defining positive political theory as a collection of "nonnormative, rational-choice theories of political institutions" (emphasis omitted)).
55.
See Jeffries, supra note 7, at 197; Kahan, supra note 7, at 404-06.
56.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995); Kathleen F. Brickey, Crime
Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 802-04 (1996);
George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-Mail Fraud, State Law and Post-Lopez
Analysis, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 225, 226-27 (1997); Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial
Signals: A Positive Political Reading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757,
758 (1996).
57.
See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 344-50 (1971); see also McElroy v. United
States, 455 U.S. 642, 658-59 (1982); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 221-25 (1976);

Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 2180, 2245 (1998) (arguing that judicial inquiry into whether a federal law regulating
private conduct exceeds federal power should focus on whether Congress has adequately considered the need for federal intervention).
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into areas traditionally reserved for state authorities. Other solutions would
dispense with any obeisance to Congress's legislative supremacy and would
more directly attack prosecutorial power with reinvigorated doctrines of
selective prosecution" or demands that prosecutors tie their own hands by
publicly announcing guidelines. 9 The administrative control model also
might be taken one step further, as Kahan recently proposed, by importing
the Chevron doctrine to centralize prosecutorial lawmaking power in the
most politically accountable part of the Justice Department.' We might
even consider injecting a greater measure of accountability into the process
by making jurors more aware of their legislative powers."
Before urging one or more of these diverse solutions, however, or even
thinking some solution necessary, we ought to give more consideration to
the degree to which Congress really has abdicated responsibility in the
criminal area and the reasons behind its strategy (to the extent it has one).
The approach is, first, to examine what, if any, strategies can be discerned
in Congress's substantive lawmaking itself. The lack of satisfactory answers
to this inquiry sets the stage for a second inquiry, which continues the
search for legislative strategies by looking beyond substantive law.

II.

CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION STRATEGIES: THE EVIDENCE
FROM SUBSTANTIVE LAW

How might one explain legislators' willingness to eschew legislative
specificity in an area in which specificity is deemed so important and to
58.
See Poulin, supra note 49.
59.
See DAVIS, supra note 3, at 188-214; Norman Abrams, InternalPolicy: Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25-34 (1971); Charles D. Breitel, Controls in
Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 432-35 (1960); James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1543-45 (1981).
60.
See Kahan, supra note 4; see also Sanford N. Greenberg, Who Says It's a Crime?:
Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes That Create Criminal Liability, 58
U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1996). The Chevron doctrine "requires courts to defer to administrative interpretations of ambiguous statutes as binding exercises of delegated lawmaking authority." Kahan,
supra note 4, at 469; see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
It should be noted that the reluctance of most defendants to take their cases to trial, see supra
notes 18-23 and accompanying text, would limit the effectiveness of Kahan's Chevron proposal
because it relies on the litigation of prosecution theories.
61.
See Darryl K. Brown, PlainMeaning, PracticalReason, and Culpability: Toward a Theory
of Jury Interpretationof Criminal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199, 1267-68 (1998) (proposing that
instructions be redesigned to aid jurors' interpretative efforts); see also Daniel C. Richman, Old
Chief v. United States: Stipulating Away ProsecutorialAccountability?, 83 VA. L. REV. 939, 973-74
(1997) (concluding that the need for a prosecutor to "make all her decisions in the shadow of
projected jury responses" gives the community "a far greater say in how prosecutors deploy their
resources than it has through any more direct mechanism of political accountability").
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allow enforcers so much freedom in selecting targets for "community
condemnation"'
Obviously, there is no single answer to this question.
Federal criminal law encompasses narcotics trafficking, securities fraud,
environmental crimes, firearms offenses, and taking the name of "Smokey
the Bear" in vain.63 It would be indeed odd if Congress took the same
approach to criminal enforcement in all of these, and other, policy areas.
And it would be just as odd if there were any clear consensus among all its
constituent legislators in any one of these areas. We nonetheless can
review a number of possible motivations that would explain the readiness of
one or more legislators broadly to delegate enforcement authority in one or
more areas of substantive law.
A.

The Rewards of Criminal Lawmaking

To be fair to Congress, one must begin by conceding that diverse local
conditions and offender creativity might well lead public-regarding legislators to see a special virtue in having broad criminal statutes, or at least some
such statutes. Just as Chief Justice Burger once touted the breadth of the
mail fraud statute as providing a "first line of defense" "against the new
varieties of fraud that the ever-inventive American 'con artist' is sure to
develop,"' so might legislators generally seek to give enforcers maximal
discretion to combat the infinite variety of antisocial conduct.
For all its advantages, a strategy of maximal delegation would still be
politically dangerous, were there a serious risk that legislators would be held
responsible by the public, or interested segments thereof, in the event that
criminal charges were brought in a marginal case (however defined). Longstanding traditions of prosecutorial independence, however, combined with
legal doctrines that free enforcers from the obligation to pursue a case,65
ensure that legislators face little risk in this regard. The rewards for legislative precision will thus be low in the criminal area, and lawmakers will
always be safer if they err on the side of overinclusion.66 Moreover, to the
62.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROPS. 401,
404 (1958) (stating that the difference between criminal and civil penalties is that "judgment of
community condemnation" accompanies criminal sanction).
63.
See 18 U.S.C. § 711 (1994) (providing that the unauthorized use of the "Smokey the
Bear" name for profit is a misdemeanor).
64.
United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405, 407 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
65.
See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
66.
See Richman, supTa note 61, at 959 n.69; see also Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure,

Foomote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the
Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L.REV. 1079, 1090 (1993) ("Executive discretion ... operates as
an important shock-absorber that protects legislatures from hostile reaction to law enforcement
operations.").
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extent that they expect to be held accountable for prosecutions, legislators
will be confident in the fact that "a far larger number of persons, of much
greater political influence, rationally adopt the perspective of a potential
crime victim rather than the perspective of a suspect or defendant."67
Freed from the need to internalize the costs of broad enactments, the
theory goes, legislators can pursue such statutes without even considering
their enforcement consequences. Many have bemoaned the tendency of
representatives (and presidents) to use criminal statutes for symbolic and
politically profitable purposes that do not even require that any prosecutions ever be brought under them." In the political climate of the last quarter century, and even before, the normal legislative editing process simply
has not worked very well. There are perceived political rewards for supporting all criminal legislation, particularly if aimed in the direction of
some recent outrage, and political penalties for opposing or seeking to narrow all such laws.69
This cluster of theories has considerable explanatory power. Immune
from any political fallout, legislators have vied to target whatever criminal
activity has captured the public's attention. It was Congress, after all, that
forced a reluctant Hoover Administration to accept federal jurisdiction over
kidnappings, in the wake of the Lindbergh case.7" The theories may also
67.
68.

Dripps, supra note 66, at 1089.
See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 31-43 (1997); NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL
CRIME CONTROL INITIATIVES, 1960-1993, at 13-14 (1994); STUART S. SCHEINGOLD, THE
POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER 37-58 (1984); LORD WINDLESHAM, RESPONSES TO CRIME:
LEGISLATING WITH THE TIDE 182 (1996); Joel Rosch, Crime as an Issue in American Politics, in
THE POLITICS OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 19-32 (Erika S. Fairchild & Vincent J. Webb

eds., 1985); Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 23, 40-44 (1997); Sanford H. Kadish, Comment: The Folly of Overfederalization, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1247, 1248-49 (1995); Nancy E. Marion, Symbolic Policies in Clinton's Crime
Control Agenda, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 67 (1997); see also Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice
and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 111 (1990) (discussing "voters' taste for symbolic legislation").
Whether legislators are correct in thinking that sponsoring or voting for criminal statutes has
political pay-offs may be an open question. See Gerald F. Seib, Who Cares?:Many Americans View
Washington as a Mess and Just Tune It Out-Scandals, Negative Races, Policy Flops All Hurt, WALL
ST. J., June 4, 1997, at Al (discussing the lack of public interest in what Washington does and
spotlighting a congresswoman who, finding no constituent interest in pending youth crime legislation, spends more time on "local issues").
69.
See Bergman, supra note 52, at 196 (observing the relationship between election years
and omnibus crime bills, a former House staffer reports that "[e]specially noteworthy is the amount
of floor time spent repeatedly on anecdotal horrific state crimes to justify enactment of federal
law").
70.
See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 41, at 478-79; RICHARD GID POWERS,
SECRECY AND POWER: THELIFEOFJ. EDGAR HOOVER 175 (1988).
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help explain, for example, the passage of the federal carjacking statute in
the wake of the widely publicized Maryland case in which the victim of an
auto theft was dragged to her death," the especially punitive treatment
given to crack cocaine following the overdose death of basketball star Len
Bias," and the decision to make it a felony for someone convicted of a
domestic violence misdemeanor to possess a firearm-a decision made
without considering the effect that this would have on law enforcement
officers."
These theories also go far in explaining legislators' approach to a far
broader substantive law program-the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
When Congress finally heeded the sustained campaign for federal sentencing reform," its chief contribution was to create the Federal Sentencing

Commission and to delegate vast lawmaking powers to it.7" Cloaked with
the mantle of "expertise," the commission not only freed legislators from
the labors of guideline specification,76 but also insulated them from the risk
that a political opponent would cite the promulgation of a guideline below
a statutory maximum as evidence of inappropriate leniency. Yet the establishment of the commission did not foreclose legislators from acting in the
area. When legislators found it politically expedient to reject a commission
decision for being insufficiently punitive-as occurred when the commission recommended a change in the crack cocaine penalties77-they did so,
71.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994); see also Brickey, supra note 10, at 1162 n. 154.
72.
See Bergman, supra note 52, at 196; William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio:
Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1249-56 (1996) (describing
the background to the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which established the 100:1
ratio between crack penalties and those for powder cocaine).
73.
See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658,
110 Stat. 3009-371 to 372 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9)); Fraternal Order of Police v.
United States, 152 F.3d 998, 1004 (1998) (holding that Congress's failure to extend the "public
interest" exception-applicable to other portions of § 922 (g)-to the domestic violence provision
violates the Equal Protection Clause); Richman, supra note 61, at 953 n.51; Roberto Suro &
Philip P. Pan, Law's Omission DisarmsSome Police: Domestic Violence Act Has Some Officers Hanging Up Their Guns, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 1996, at A16 (describing how the blanket exception
for official use was dropped during the rush to pass appropriations legislation that included the
new domestic violence provision); see also ALLEN, supra note 11, at 81 (discussing the inadequacy
of congressional deliberation on criminal provisions).
74.
See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993).
75.
See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Star. 1987 (1984);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of delegation to the sentencing commission).
76.
See Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law Perspective on
the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1991).
77.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995).
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notwithstanding the commission's supposed expertise. 8 Nor, for similar
reasons, have they shrunk from imposing guidelines-trumping statutory mandatory minimums, particularly in the narcotics area. 7' These and other
examples have led many to see the process of criminal lawmaking in recent
years as more akin to the publication of campaign literature than to a considered deployment of federal enforcement resources.
B.

Interest Groups and the Enforcement Bureaucracy

Any tale of legislative insouciance, however, has some clear limitations. Much federal enforcement activity does target groups without significant political power."0 Yet a considerable amount of legislative activity
potentially affects constituencies with real political clout (not to mention
the legislators themselves)."' And if one were to pick out the federal criminal statutes whose breadth and vagueness were most likely to raise troubling
issues of prosecutorial license and to chill legitimate economic activity, or
sensitive intergovernmental relationships, one would start, not with carjacking or narcotics laws, but with the mail fraud, Hobbs Act, money laundering statutes, and RICO-all standards in the prosecutor's white-collar
arsenal. 2 One need not be a card-carrying public choice theorist to believe
78.

See Spade, supra note 72.

79.

See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on

the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1752 (1992) ("Congress gave the ... Sentencing
Commission a difficult task to perform and not much time to begin carrying it out. At the same
time, Congress began enacting numerous mandatory minimum penalties, a preoccupation that
eight years later has cast a depressing shadow over the Commission's task."); Wright, supra note
76, at 78 ("Statutes containing new mandatory minima may constitute the single largest threat by
Congress to administrative development of sentencing guidelines."); see also U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991).
80.
See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1816-24
(1998) (noting structural sources of bias).
81.
One legislator currently "tak[]ing aim at prosecutorial power" is Representative Joseph
McDade (R. Pa.), recently acquitted of charges that he accepted bribes in exchange for funneling
defense contracts to certain firms. See T.R. Goldman, For McDade, Life Fuels Legislation, LEGAL
TIMES, May 18, 1998, at 1.
82.
See Lynch, supra note 8, at 2137 ("Mail fraud, money laundering, and a host of strict
liability regulatory offenses are only the most notorious examples of statutes that are ill-defined,
overbroad, or insufficiently concerned with culpability."); see also ALLEN, supra note 11, at 86-89;

Jimmy Gurule, The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986: Creating a New Federal Offense or
Merely Affording Federal Prosecutors an Alternative Means of Punishing Specified Unlawful Activity?,
32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823 (1995); Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal
Fraud: The Changing Nature of the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 460-76 (1995);
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch over Us, 31
HARV. J. LEGIS. 153, 188-99 (1994); Robert G. Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Bal-

ance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Expansive Legislation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137 (1995);
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that securities, tax, campaign finance, and other regulatory legislation are at
least in part shaped by assertions of political power by the interest groups
most directly affected. Should one assume that these groups' lobbying
efforts grind to a halt at the civil-criminal divide (a divide that has become
all too hazy),83 and that they make no effort to limit broad legislation that
threatens them with the most severe stigma and sanctions?" Given how
much administrative and legislative activity has centered around finetuning
prohibitions that have parallel civil and criminal applications, like insidertrading provisions under the securities laws," why has there been so little
effort to restrict the freedom of prosecutors to pursue the same conduct
using the mail or wire fraud statutes?" Even if one believes that legislators
are spectacularly public regarding in the criminal area, a story that completely
omits the many politically powerful interest groups potentially affected by
broad criminal statutes is hard to accept.
It is not very surprising that one rarely sees high-profile efforts by
interest groups to limit purely criminal statutes. Expectations that federal
enforcers will appropriately exercise their gatekeeping authority put a special burden on a group that wants statutory immunization. To make a
compelling case, the group publicly has to argue not only that its socially
Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691, 693-707 (1990);
Peter D. Hardy, Note, The Emerging Role of the Quid Pro Quo Requirement in Public Corruption
Prosecutions Under the Hobbs Act, 28 MICH. J.L. REFORM 409, 411 (1995); Michael D. Paley,
Note, Prosecuting FailedAttempts to Fix Prices as Violations of the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes: Elliot
Ness is Back!, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 333, 345-65 (1995); Rachel Ratliff, Comment, Third-Party Money
Laundering: Problems of Proofand ProsecutorialDiscretion, 7 STAN. L.& POL'Y REV. 173 (1996).
83.
See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1798 (1992).
84.
See DAVID 0. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 249 (1996) ("The more limited legal response to white collar crime
(relative to conventional crime) reflects in part the considerable input businesspeople have in the
making and implementation of white collar crime laws .... ).
85.
See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest
Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311 (1987); Richard
W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L.
REV. 153 (1998); Steve Thel, Statutory Findings and Insider Trading Regulation, 50 VAND. L. REV.
1091, 1107-15 (1997); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the
Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407 (1995).
Richard Lazarus notes that the "vast majority of existing environmental crime provisions ... are
defined as violations of existing statutory or regulatory requirements. The only distinction
between a civil and a criminal violation is that criminal defendants act with a culpable state of
mind .... Lazarus, supra, at 2448-49.
86.
Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (dividing equally on the application of the securities fraud statute to insider-trading cases-an issue the Court later resolved in
United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997)-the Court upheld mail fraud convictions based
on the same conduct); United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cit. 1995) (rejecting the government's securities fraud theory but affirming mail fraud convictions).
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valuable activities theoretically can be prosecuted under the law in question, and will therefore be chilled, but also that there is a real possibility
that prosecutors will actually pursue such conduct." These arguments can
sound perilously close to admissions that a group plans to pursue an antisocial or immoral course of conduct. While concentrated interest group
power can be publicly deployed to criminalize conduct," groups might well
prefer less-visible means of restrainingcriminal enforcement.
One way to harmonize interest group activity with the breadth of substantive criminal law would be to draw on the explanation that positive
political theorists often offer for broad congressional delegation in areas
of significant interest group concern. Such delegations do not merely allow
a legislator to seek credit for addressing some problem and to shift blame to
agencies for any unpopular action. They also allow him opportunities for
"vote-winning casework" wherein he earns credit from constituents or
interest groups by intervening with the agency on their behalf.89
The explanatory power of this theory is pretty limited in the criminal
context, however, because such casework will generally not be much of an

option. There may well be easy points to be made with constituents and
contributors by intervening with enforcers to encourage the initiation of a
prosecution. 90 But intervention to discourage a single prosecution or class
87.
When a federal criminal statute can be invoked without such gatekeeping, as in the
case of RICO, groups have not been shy about condemning statutory breadth. See infra note 144.
88.
Perhaps such a story lies behind the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1831-1832 (Supp. 11 1996), which appears to criminalize, and federalize, the "entire law of
trade secrets." Otto G. Obermaier & Ronald R. Rossi, Too Many Federalized Crimes?, N.Y.L.J.,
July 6, 1998, at 9, 10; see Joseph F. Savage, Jr., I Spy: The New Economic Espionage Act Can Be
Risky Business, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1997, at 12, 13; see also Lanier Saperstein, Copyrights, Criminal
Sanctions and Economic Rents: Applying the Rent Seeking Model to the Criminal Law Formulation
Process, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1470 (1997) (explaining the use of criminal sanctions in
the copyright area as a product of rent seeking by interest groups favored by enforcement).
89.
See GLEN 0. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC
LAW 76-77 (1991); see also MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON
ESTABLISHMENT 41-49 (1977); Morris P. Fiorina & Roger G. Noll, Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators: A Rational Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy, 9 J. PUB. ECON. 239, 251-53
(1978); Shaviro, supra note 68, at 92.
90.
See COMMITTEE ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, COMBATTING FRAUD, ABUSE, AND
MISCONDUCT IN THE NATION'S FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CURRENT FEDERAL EFFORTS ARE
INADEQUATE, H.R. REP. No. 100-1088, at 18-20 (1988) [hereinafter COMBATTING FRAUD]
(criticizing the Justice Department for insufficient zeal in prosecuting fraud cases arising out of the
savings and loan crisis); Williams, supra note 27, at 147-48 (recounting how independent automobile manufacturer Preston Tucker was prosecuted with the encouragement of Michigan Senator Warren Ferguson, who had received substantial campaign support from the "big three" auto
manufacturers of Detroit); Theodora Galacatos, Note, The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional
Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 587, 612-28 (1995)
(recounting efforts by legislators to investigate instances of allegedly unwarranted prosecutorial

Federal Criminal Law

777

of prosecutions can be quite expensive politically. They may not always be
deterred, but politicians can expect a public outcry if any hint of tampering
emerges, both because the public values prosecutorial independence and
because the parties most likely to need congressional intervention will generally have done obviously bad (indeed criminal) things." In her valuable
study of the Antitrust Division, Suzanne Weaver found that the division's
chiefs frequently declined to discuss particular cases during oversight hearings, explaining that "these are prosecutorial matters to be held in
confidence."92 Recognizing that "[i]f senators do not want to be seen delving into the internal operations of a law enforcement agency, one should
look to the more private contacts" between senators and their staff and the
division, Weaver looked further.93 She found, however, that even in their
informal, low-visibility contacts, legislators had a "fear of entanglement in
prosecutorial matters."" In his study of U.S. Attorneys' Offices, James
Eisenstein similarly found that "[slenators, local politicians, even some
defendants, believe it would be improper to try to influence a U.S. attorney's decisions directly."" This is not to say that such political interference
never occurs. But the principle of prosecutorial independence runs deep

leniency); Clifford Krauss, Senate Urges Federal Inquiry on Crown Heights, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
1993, at B5 (reporting unanimous Senate resolution, offered by Senators Dole and D'Amato, that
called for the Justice Department to investigate the killing of Yankel Rosenbaum in Crown
Heights, Brooklyn).
91.
Even in the regulatory area, the political costs when an elected official is found to have
interceded on behalf of a suspected criminal can be high, as the plight of the "Keating Five" demonstrated. See Phil Kuntz & Janet Hook, Even Without New Guidelines, Senators Tiptoe to Safe
Side, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Mar. 2, 1991, at 524. A RICO "reform" bill received significant
negative publicity when its chief sponsor, Senator DeConcini, was linked to Charles Keating. See
MARION, supra note 68, at 208.
SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
92.
IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 151 (1977).
Id.
93.

94.
95.

Id. at 153.
JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE

POLITICAL AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 204 (1978).
See DAVID BURNHAM, ABOVE THE LAW: SECRET DEALS, POLITICAL FIXES AND
96.
OTHER MISADVENTURES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 228-29 (1996). Despite this

book's sensational title, it offers few examples of straightforward political interference on behalf of
a prosecution target. It does recount how, in 1908, a Republican national committeeman enlisted
President Theodore Roosevelt's aid in trying to derail (at least temporarily) the department's
investigation of price fixing in the electrical supply business. See id. Attorney General Charles
Bonaparte was not deterred, however. "Imay be unduly nervous on the subject," he wrote to
Roosevelt, "but it seems to me that the danger to be guarded against in this campaign is any
appearance of solidarity with the trusts." Id. at 229 (internal quotation marks omitted). He noted
that intervention by people like the committeeman "in matters of this description may be called
to the attention of the hostile press." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and makes it highly unlikely that the hope of serving constituents lies
beyond the extent of congressional delegation in this area.
Even if casework is not a real option in the criminal area, positive
political theory offers another way in which broad delegation can serve
powerful private interests and therefore may be done at their behest.
"[Tiransfer of political power to the bureaucracy," Glen Robinson has
suggested, "encourages private interests at the expense of the broad public"
because "broad delegations favor concentrated groups relative to those more
diffusely organized" and "the agency offers the interest group ... a more
effect[ivel forum for action."97 Because "[ilnterest groups have more confidence in their ability to influence agency outcomes than to influence
congressional outcomes,"98 perhaps they encourage Congress to write broad
criminal statutes that allow enforcers to exercise sweeping discretion in a
low-visibility setting.99
There may be something to such a theory of direct influence. A great
deal of secrecy surrounds the criminal process, particularly with respect to
who does not get prosecuted."° The complexities of plea bargaining also
make it quite difficult for an outsider to determine whether a person or
entity that did get prosecuted received unduly lenient treatment from the
government. Rather than seek the specific exclusion of their conduct from
broad white-collar prohibitions-a legislative favor that would be quite
expensive, maybe politically impossible, to obtain-perhaps "respectable"
special interests prefer to obtain their exemptions in the relative privacy of
an enforcer's office. In this setting, their ability to inflict costs on the government, and the skill and influence of their lawyers, recruited from the

97.

ROBINSON, supra note 89, at 78-79; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice and the

Legal Academy, 86 GEO. L.J. 1075, 1082-83 (1998) (reviewing JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED,
CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997))

("[Wihen an issue is highly complex and lacks salience with voters, and when there are few
competing groups interested in defining policy, a vague statute coupled with a broad delegation

would appear desirable.").
98. Macey, supra note 97, at 1088.
99.
See Dripps, supra note 66, at 1090-91 ("Legislatures may authorize police and
prosecutors to investigate and punish in ways that might in theory offend powerful interest groups,
but police and prosecutors in practice are likely to exercise their discretion so as to avoid such
unpleasant collisions.").
100.
See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486 (1996) (citing the need to
avoid unnecessary imposition on "performance of a core executive constitutional function" when
explaining its reluctance to allow discovery into prosecutorial files); Wayte v. United States, 470

U.S. 598, 607 (1985) ("Examining the basis of a prosecution ... may undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy."); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1373 (1987).
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elite white-collar bar, could be brought to bear most effectively.' And the
expectation of many federal prosecutors that they will join this elite bar
could play a critical role in ensuring that the government exercises "reasonable restraint.' ' °
There are, however, significant problems with this theory. First, it
gives little consideration to the ideological motivations that may have
drawn federal prosecutors to their jobs.0 3 Moreover, even were one to
assume that personal economic interest dominates the prosecutorial calculus, it would not necessarily guarantee restraint. It is, after all, the dogged
prosecutor who wins guilty verdicts in close cases against powerful
defendants whose talents are often considered the most valuable by the private sector.1 4 Finally, and most importantly, the fragmentation of federal
enforcement authority would substantially undercut the effectiveness of any
such system of low-visibility lobbying.
Powerful interest groups might indeed have important advantages
when dealing with an agency that exercises centralized rule making or even
adjudicatory authority.0 However, there is no agency in the federal criminal apparatus that would allow such one-stop shopping. Investigative
authority in the federal system is famously fragmented, with more than fifty
101.
See KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF
ATTORNEYS AT WORK 78-79 (1985); see also EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 171-82 (describing
patterns of interaction between federal prosecutors and defense attorneys); Lynch, supra note 8, at
2124-29 (describing the process through which well-financed white-collar defendants negotiate
with prosecutors).
102.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 174-75 ("The cooperation and cordiality that typify
assistants' interactions with private attorneys reflect at least in part their eagerness to enhance
their career prospects."); WEAVER, supra note 92, at 160-61 (noting that Antitrust Division lawyers regard the "close connections" that they "maintain with their colleagues in the private antitrust bar" as a "powerful constraint on their actions").
103.
See Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing:. A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and
"Empirical" Practice of thePublic Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 219-20 (1988) ("Survey
evidence seems to support the commonsensical view that leaders quite frequently sacrifice financially when entering public life or care less about money than people who stay in the private
sector, but this evidence is largely ignored [by public choice theorists.]" (footnotes omitted));
Richman, supra note 61, at 988.
104.
See Richman, supra note 61, at 987 n. 168; see also Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade
Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1969).
The principal attraction of [FTC] service to lawyers who wish to use it as a steppingstone
to private practice lies in the opportunities it affords to gain trial experience ....It is the
experience of trying cases, the more the better, not the social payoff from the litigation,
that improves the professional skills and earning prospects of FTC lawyers.
Posner, supra, at 86.
105.
This is the context in which Glen Robinson speaks. See ROBINSON, supra note 89, at
78 ("[Tlhe agency rule-making forum is probably superior to the legislative forum for those wellorganized groups that seek active government intervention simply because it is cheaper and easier
to obtain effective results.").
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federal "police" agencies and "as many as 200 ...that have some criminal
enforcement role.,, 106 To be sure, many types of crimes-the typical whitecollar ones, for instance-do not fall within the jurisdiction of most of these
agencies. But if potential white-collar targets desired a rapprochement with
all those agencies most likely to initiate fraud cases against them, they
would be ill-advised to deal only with the FBI and to ignore the Postal
Inspection Service and the Secret Service, to name just two. This is not to
say that an agency-based strategy will never work. Indeed, as discussed
later, ' 7 it is perfectly suited to an area of enforcement-such as firearmsdominated by a single, politically weak agency (although to put it this way
may mix up cause with effect). The point is only that such a strategy would
probably not be effective in a great many enforcement areas, when one
agency can rush in to occupy space left by the restraint of another.'
One might respond that the fragmentation of investigative authority
poses no obstacle to interest groups seeking restraint because they can still
deal with the prosecutors at the Justice Department, who serve as gatekeepers in every criminal case. But this is not at all clear. Some agencies, particularly the FBI, have a considerable degree of independence and political
power. 9 Moreover, the relationship between federal investigative agencies
and federal prosecutors is coordinate, not hierarchical." Should an agency
decide to make the pursuit of certain criminal conduct a high priority, the
refusal of departmental prosecutors to seek indictments will doom the
agency's initiative, but the cost to the prosecutors may be high."' Most
106.
NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 6 (2d ed. 1993); see also William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations Between
Federal and Local Police, in 15 MODERN POLICING 231, 243 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris
eds., 1992).
107.
See infra Part III.B.
108.
See Geller & Morris, supra note 106, at 247-49 (discussing turf battles between federal
law enforcement agencies).
109.
See infra notes 169-173 and accompanying text. In this status, as in much else, the FBI
benefits from the work of its chief image maker. Soon after taking over the Bureau of Investigation, Director Hoover required the heads of the agency's field offices "to visit the U.S. attorney
in their district at least once a month to remind them that the special agents detailed to assist in
investigations were really working for Hoover." POWERS, supra note 70, at 152; see also Geller &
Morris, supra note 106, at 299 (noting that Hoover's objections to organized crime strike forces in
the 1960s and 1970s reflected his "characteristic opposition to having FBI agents supervised by
anyone other than Bureau personnel").
110.
On the Justice Department's organizational chart, the lines of authority for prosecutors
and investigative agencies meet only at the level of the deputy attorney general and the attorney
general. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 106, at 11. Other investigative agencies, such as the
IRS, Secret Service, ATF, and Customs Service, are housed within the Treasury Department and
formally do not report to any Justice Department officials.
111.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 150-62 (discussing interactions between U.S. Attorneys' Offices and enforcement agencies).
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importantly, though, federal prosecutorial authority is itself famously fragmented. The huge majority of criminal cases are brought, not by the
litigating divisions under the direct control of assistant attorneys general,
but by the ninety-four U.S. Attorneys' Offices, whose chiefs are appointed
by the president, usually with considerable local input. These offices,
whose prosecutorial authority predates the Justice Department's," ' have a
long tradition of independence from Washington."'
The freedom of the U.S. Attorneys' Offices is far from absolute, and
there are many mechanisms through which "Main Justice"'1 4 can assert its
authority over a recalcitrant office. At least in theory, Washington can
reduce funding, resolve jurisdictional conflicts in favor of other offices, use
the disciplinary process or removal power, and give the cold shoulder to
U.S. attorneys when they return to private practice."' And recent years
have seen an effort by Main Justice to "exercise greater supervisory control
over decision-making by United States attorneys in the field, with a view to
making federal prosecutive policy more uniform nationwide.""6 Yet, U.S.
attorneys retain a remarkable degree of power. 7 This is particularly true of
the U.S. attorneys in the large metropolitan districts, where cases involving
powerful economic groups are perhaps most likely to arise.'
112.
See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 41, at 218-29; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14-22 (1994).
113.
See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
U.S. ATTORNEYS Do NOT PROSECUTE MANY SUSPECTED VIOLATORS OF FEDERAL LAWS
(1978); EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 54-100; Nancy V. Baker, The Attorney General as a Legal
Policy-Maker: Conflicting Loyalties, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 31, 40 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995).
114.
This is the term most insiders use to refer to the central bureaucracy of the Justice
Department in Washington, D.C. See JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE: THE MEN
AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATION'S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GUARD ITS LIBERTIES 7
(1996). 1 must admit, though, that in the Southern District of New York, we usually spoke of "the
Justice Department" when referring to Washington-making clear that we thought of ourselves as
working for some other entity.
115.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 76-100.
116.
ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 106, at 8.
117.
See 7 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.000
(1997) (giving U.S. attorneys "plenary authority" over prosecutions in their districts).
118.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 116 ("The size of the office provides the best single
indication of the relationship between a U.S. attorney and the department. The larger the office,
the more likely it is to be ... 'semiautonomous."'); see also id. at 108 (noting that the Southern
District of New York "serves as a constant reminder to the department that its field offices can
achieve a position of semiautonomy and it provides other U.S. attorneys with a model of how

much independence is possible"); Todd S. Purdum, Former Special Counsels See Need to Alter Law
That Created Them, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1998, at Al (noting that he had "no more leeway as
independent counsel [in the Michael K. Deaver matter] than he had earlier had as United States
Attorney in Manhattan in the Nixon Administration," Whitney North Seymour, Jr. observed
that "'[tihe United States Attorney for the Southern District has almost unlimited power'). See
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Given this state of affairs and the fact that the flexibility of federal
venue requirements often expose potential targets (particularly in the
white-collar area) to prosecution in several different districts," 9 it seems
unlikely, as a general matter, that the idea behind Congress's broad delegation is to move the effective legislative process to a low-visibility arena in
which special interest groups are more likely to exercise influence directly.
Were this the case, one would expect that, at the very least, Congress
would do a lot more to subordinate U.S. Attorneys' Offices to departmental
control and move policy making to the wholesale, rather than the retail
level. This, Congress has been quite loathe to do, despite its keen awareness of the extent of U.S. attorney independence.'
(The measures Congress has taken in this regard are discussed in Part III.)
This is not to say that particular entities are not well served by the
fragmentation of federal enforcement authority. And the favorable treatment that a military contractor, for example, is able to get from a local U.S.
Attorney's Office that is aware of the firm's importance to the local
economy, or that a local politician can get in recognition of his clout in
Washington, may be one of the things Congress has in mind when it
embraces these institutional structures. The point is simply that fragmentation makes it much harder for a geographically dispersed group comprising
many such entities to lobby federal enforcers directly for restraints that
benefit all the members of the group, and that any such restraints, if

obtained, are not likely to be reliable. As a general matter, then, it is difficult to explain the breadth of congressional delegation as an effort to
facilitate such direct influence.

generally JAMES B. STEWART, THE PROSECUTORS: INSIDE THE OFFICES OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
MOST POWERFUL LAWYERS (1987).
119.
Offenses "begun in one district and completed in another" may be "prosecuted in any
district in which [the] offense was begun, continued, or completed." 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1994);
see United States v. Cabrales, 118 S. Ct. 1772, 1776 (1998).
120.
See, e.g., COMBATTING FRAUD, supra note 90, at 144-47 (faulting several U.S. attorneys for failing to give financial institution fraud the priority being demanded by the attorney
general); COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 113, at 13 ("[C]urrent
prosecution philosophy, priorities, and guidelines reflect individual district thinking rather than
a nationwide policy.
Consequently, differing applications of justice occur."); GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-150, U.S ATTORNEYS: MORE ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
IMPLEMENTING PRIORITY PROGRAMS IS DESIRABLE 11 (1995) (quoting one U.S. attorney as saying "that he does not pay much attention to national priorities, preferring to trust his staffs
judgment, focus on local interests, and prosecute anything that is big enough to warrant his
office's attention").
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State Governmental Interests

There is one special interest for which the fragmentation of federal
prosecutorial authority does offer great advantages: state and local law
enforcement authorities. For this group, the extent of federal intrusion
authorized by Congress into their traditional areas of responsibility brings
enormous benefits. First, of course, are those benefits directly from the
cases that the feds prosecute, cases that would often be prohibitively expensive for the local authorities. The federal resources devoted to street crime,
drug crimes, and even organized crime and corruption may themselves
be limited, but they can be strategically invested-in such expensive tools
as electronic surveillance, witness protection, and prosecutorial support for
investigations-because federal agencies are largely excused from the political obligation to patrol an expansive beat in these areas.'2 ' Federal prosecutors can also bring cases that would be procedurally impossible in state
court and that generally result in higher sentences for defendants.'
The shadow that the possibility of federal intervention casts over the
state system, however, brings advantages to state enforcers going far beyond
slightly lightening their caseload.'
Some advantages inure to the citizens
they serve: The threat of federal charges carrying higher effective penalties
can be used by state prosecutors to extract guilty pleas from defendants in
their own system and may also enhance the deterrent effect of state penal
laws.' Other advantages inure chiefly to the enforcers and may even illserve the citizenry. While responsibility for street crime and most other
traditionally local offenses may never get shifted to the federal government,
the possibility of federal intervention will often allow state enforcers to
evade some accountability for failures to prosecute a particular case or class
121.
See Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1211 (1977) (noting the ability of federal
enforcers to focus on a small number of cases).
122.
See Clymer, supra note 10, at 668-75; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1103-25
(1995) (discussing the advantages of federal prosecution).
123.
See Clymer, supra note 10, at 676 ("Although prosecution under duplicative federal
statutes constitutes a substantial portion of federal prosecutors' caseloads, most offenders who are
eligible for both federal and state prosecution are charged in state court. Indeed, federal prosecutors lack the resources to bring charges in more than a small percentage of such cases." (footnotes omitted)).
124.
See Brickey, supra note 10, at 1159 nn.138-39 (describing the theory behind Rudolph
Giuliani's "federal day" initiative and noting that Senator Biden once introduced legislation that
would have created "a national federal day each month to bring all locally arrested drug offenders
into the federal system"). But see Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 145 U.
PA. L. REV. 1309, 1334-37 (1997) (questioning the empirical validity of this theory).
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of cases." By coordinating their activities with federal enforcers, state
authorities can also profit economically by gaining access to federal funds
and equipment and, in recent years, using federal "equitable sharing" procedures to retain proceeds
from forfeitable property that might otherwise go
27
to state treasuries.
These diverse benefits, however, could potentially come at considerable cost if federal enforcers used their broadly delegated power to cherrypick the most politically rewarding cases in order to advance a bureaucratic
agenda or their careers. They doubtless do this on some occasions. 8 Yet
one rarely sees state enforcers complaining to Congress about the extent of

concurrent jurisdiction.'

The deafening silence is not merely because the

125.
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (finding accountability
diminished when citizens cannot easily determine which level of government is responsible for a
particular regulatory decision); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism,82 MINN. L. REV. 317,394-97
(1997); Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 125.
But see Brown, supra note 56, at 284 (arguing that federal enforcement of state norms in the corruption area would "further accountability" because "citizens ...will ask why their own officials
are not enforcing their law").
It is noteworthy that during Prohibition, perhaps the first period of significant concurrent
criminal jurisdiction, most states were quite content to leave primary enforcement responsibility
to the federal government. See CLAIRE BOND POTTER, WAR ON CRIME: BANDITS, G-MEN, AND
THE POLITICS OF MASS CULTURE 17-19 (1998); Louis B. Boudin, The Place of the AntiRacketeering Act in Our Constitutional-LegalSystem, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 273-74 (1943).
126.
See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-150, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL: VIOLENT CRIME FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE INFIGHTING
Los ANGELES GANG VIOLENCE 2-3, 6 (1996) (surveying local law enforcement officers reports
that, according to them, the chief benefits of federal involvement are overtime pay, manpower,
office space, wiretaps, equipment, money for informants and drug/gun purchases, and federal
prosecution of cases).
127.
See DAVID W. RASMUSSEN & BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ECONOMIC ANATOMY OF A
DRUG WAR: CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE COMMONS 132-39 (1994) (analyzing the efforts of state
law enforcement authorities to use federal forfeiture provisions as a means of evading restrictions
imposed by local laws and politics); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug
War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 106-08 (1998).
128.
See, e.g., Ronald Smothers, In Millionaire's Killing, Debate on Trying Youths as Adults,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1997, at B4 ("[Llawyers familiar with juvenile cases ... said it was probably
the prominence of the case [involving the kidnapping and murder of a millionaire] that accounted
for its moving into the Federal courts. Such cases, the lawyers said, can help prosecutors burnish
an image of being tough on crime."); see also EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 230-31 (noting career
paths of U.S. attorneys); Kahan, supra note 4, at 486 ("U.S. Attorneys are extraordinarily ambi,
tious and frequently enter electoral politics after leaving office.").
129.
See Geller & Morris, supra note 106, at 312-13 (finding those in the system content
with the current federal-state division of policing authority); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal
Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127, 1130 (1997) (noting that states are generally
"loath to complain about federal encroachment"). But see William L. Murphy, Letter to the Editor, Eschewing Intrusive Federal Help, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 16, 1998, at 30 (District attorney of
Richmond County, New York, and president of the National District Attorneys Association
notes: "When the Congress enacts new criminal statutes that duplicate state efforts it leads to
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benefits of federal activity outweigh the costs, but because the costs are
small. There are several reasons for the small costs. First, the fragmentation of federal enforcement authority ensures that prosecutorial discretion is
primarily exercised by U.S. Attorneys' Offices, led by appointees beholden
to legislators, 3 ° who in turn nurture ties to state and local institutions." ' In
contrast to political interference intended to shield a target from prosecution, intervention on behalf of state enforcers carries no risk, and legislators are not shy about demanded cooperation with the authorities in their
home districts.
The possibility of such intervention, however, is merely a backup for
state authorities. Their primary means of ensuring federal cooperation lies
in their control of informational networks on which federal law enforcement agencies must rely when pursuing episodic criminal activity of the sort
that state enforcers traditionally handle.'
When federal agencies pursue
organized criminal groups, such as Mafia families or drug-trafficking networks, they can develop their own informants and work up.'
Federal
agencies can similarly develop information sources in the special areas that
conflicting priorities and allocation of assets that causes both federal and local law enforcement
organizations to be less effective and efficient than we could or want to be.").
130.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 35-53 (discussing the U.S. attorney appointment
process); cf. Griffin B. Bell & Daniel J. Meador, Appointing United States Attorneys, 9 J.L. & POL.
247 (1993) (arguing that vesting the attorney general with complete control over the selection of
U.S. attorneys would remove the influence of local politics and therefore be beneficial).
131.
See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1545 (1994)
("[Federall administrators are beholden to members of Congress who can be prevailed upon to
intervene on behalf of the states."); see also Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 F.3d 730, 740 (3d
Cir. 1997) (Weis, J.,
dissenting) (observing that "parochial concerns become more influential" at
the U.S. attorney level, as opposed to the national level).
132.
James Q. Wilson noted:
[Bly and large, at least among the knowledgeable legislators serving on the relevant
committees, the congressional interest is in whether, and to what extent, a federal
agency serves constituent needs that are, if not locally defined, then illustrated by local
examples. FBI and DEA budget hearings are.., dominated.., by questions about the
drug or crime situation in particular localities, the needs of local police departments for
aid and cooperation, allegations of misconduct in various communities, and the work of
the agency in handling named crimes, extremist activities, and drug-trafficking groups.
WILSON, supra note 37, at 196-97.
133.
The Lindbergh kidnapping case offers an example of how these restraining influences
converged in the FBI's early years. Annoyed at efforts of J. Edgar Hoover's newly galvanized Division of Investigation to intervene, the chief of the New Jersey state police, Colonel Norman
Schwartzkopf, banned division agents from New Jersey state patrol cars assigned to the investigation. Schwartzkopf also introduced a resolution at a national meeting of state police chiefs that
condemned the division for its "lack of cooperation" in the case, and the attorney general heard
complaints from both New Jersey senators. Federal activity in the case virtually ceased soon
thereafter. See POTTER, supra note 125, at 114-15.
134.
See WILSON, supra note 37, at 61-88 (discussing the development and use of informants by the FBI and DEA).
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they regularly patrol, like the securities markets or diplomatic communities.
As federal interest moves down to more episodic criminal activity, like
street crimes, agencies become more dependent on local police departments, the only entities whose tentacles reach every street corner. Even
the FBI, whose esprit (critics might use a different term) is legendary among
law enforcement agencies, has long recognized the need to cultivate, and
not alienate, local police forces. 35' Thus, while federal enforcers have professional and personal reasons to compete with their state counterparts for
the "hottest" cases, they can rarely afford to do so."'
Viewed this way, the breadth of the delegation to federal enforcers in
areas of traditional state authority emerges not as an intrusion, but as a form
of aid-in-kind to state enforcers. 37 Indeed, the extent of delegation, coupled with the informational asymmetry from which state authorities derive
their power, may well serve state enforcer interests better than would direct
grants of the sort given in Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
(LEAA) programs. With direct grants"' comes the obligation to account
for expenditures, an obligation likely to be taken seriously in the wake of
135.
See id. at 195 (stating that the DEA and FBI must "cultivate the goodwill of, and provide some services to" local and state police departments "in part because federal agencies are to a
degree dependent on local ones for investigatory assistance-checking out names, recruiting
informants, gathering intelligence").
The FBI has long offered numerous enticements to local police agencies. Some, like centralized data banks and interstate assistance, generally aid the enforcement activities of those agencies. See id. at 289-98. Others, like slots in the FBI's National Academy, have the added effect
of directly advancing the careers of participating officers. See POWERS, supra note 70, at 217
("This training school had the practical political effect of creating a strong constituency for
Hoover and the FBI within local police leadership throughout the country, since an academy
diploma was a powerful aid to a police officer's advancement."). The days when the agency would
offer cash rewards to police officers for information appear to be over. See POTTER, supra note
125, at 194 (recommending that two police officers be given $500 each, the head of the Los
Angeles office noted, in 1934, that the money "would be one of the best investments the Division
could make to stimulate active interest in police officers in this district to give information
directly to this Division").
136.
See Geller & Morris, supra note 106, at 249 ("The main problems today are not federallocal; they're federal-federal." (quoting the past president of the International Association of
Chiefs of Police) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also id. at 266 n.18 (noting that an
organized crime expert attributes the successes of U.S. Attorney Giuliani in that area to his sensitivity to the needs of police department hierarchy).
137.
Explaining how his agency determined whether to take a case to federal or to state
prosecutors, Captain William Robertson of the City of Richmond, Virginia, Police Department
noted, in 1998, that "'it's like buying a car: we're going to the place we feel we can get the best
deal. We shop around."' Charles D. Bonner, Comment, The Federalization of Crime: Too Much of
a Good Thing?, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 905, 930 (1998).

138.
There are a number of direct grant programs to localities currently administered by the
Justice Department, the most famous being those to put more police officers on the streets. See
1997 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 33-34.
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the claims of waste and inefficiency that were leveled at the LEAA.

9

Coordinated operations with federal agencies bring assistance without any

such accountability. If any entities are indeed being "commandeered"'40
when politically rewarding "overfederalization" puts federal agents and
prosecutors into the battle against street crime, they are federal, not state

and local.' 4'
D. Beyond Substantive Lawmaking
If, putting aside the special case of state and local governments, the
breadth of Congress's delegation to federal enforcers cannot be seen as
motivated by a general effort to enable interest groups to influence prosecutorial policies directly, how then are we to explain legislators' strategy?
There are a number of possibilities: The first, of course, is that our initial
curiosity was misplaced. This is the one legislative area in which there is no
interest group story to be told. Once they satisfy the perceived popular
demand for the criminalization of a broad range of conduct'42 and for the
establishment of an enforcement apparatus empowered to make its own
targeting choices, legislators find that the costs of further work in this area
outweigh the returns.

A second, somewhat related, possibility is that legislators find such
costs particularly unnecessary because they are largely satisfied with the
choices that enforcers make. Perhaps the fragmented system that has Main
Justice tied, through the president, to national political forces; U.S.
Attorneys' Offices' reflecting a mix of local and national politics, and
139.
See MARION, supra note 68, at 136.
140.
This is the sin said to occur when state officials are required to help execute federal law.
See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (striking down a provision of the Brady
Act that, according to the Court, conscripted state officers to enforce a federal regulatory program);
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1995-96 (1993).
141.
See Role of Federal Law Enforcement, Hearing of the Crime Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm., Federal News Service, Nov. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File
(quoting a General Accounting Office (GAO) official who notes that FBI activities coordinated
with local enforcement agencies are funded out of the FBI's regular operating funds).
142.
The demand for broad symbolic condemnation of certain conduct could come from
special interests as well, such as market professionals who would like the appearance of regulation
to attract investment. However, as Michael Levi found when studying antifraud regulation in
Great Britain, groups and even individuals may be conflicted on this matter:
[Tihe desire to protect public confidence in the legitimacy of the system is countered by
the fear of damaging the volume of trade and of putting themselves and their colleagues
at risk of being convicted of criminal offences; and many groups have conflicting shortterm and long-term interests which are not resolvable in a self-evident way.
MICHAEL LEVI, REGULATING FRAUD: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS

84(1987).

788

46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 757 (1999)

enforcement agencies caught somewhere in between, happens to work
tolerably enough. After all, this system allows flexible responses to local
circumstances and a moderating balance of power between prosecutors and
agencies, and between Washington and the districts. Under these circumstances, legislators and interest groups might have considerable confidence
that enforcers will exercise their discretion appropriately, pursuing only
those "bad apples" deserving of punishment. 43 This perhaps would explain
why, for instance, most of the efforts of business and labor groups to reform
the RICO statute have been directed at its civil provisions, with spokesmen
often contrasting civil abuses with the Justice Department's responsible
gatekeeping.' 4
There may be considerable truth in these hypotheses. But like so
many other analyses of congressional activity in the criminal areaparticularly those that simply focus on the apparent sweep of prosecutorial
power engendered by substantive federal criminal law-they all underestimate the richness of Congress's interactions with the federal enforcement apparatus and the extent to which enforcers' decisions are likely to
reflect legislative preferences.

See JOACHIM J. SAVELSBERG & PETER BRUHL, CONSTRUCTING WHITE-COLLAR
147-48 (1994) ("There is reason to believe
that much of the white-collar initiative [in the late 1970s and early 1980s] simply expanded punitive responses to members of the lower middle and middle classes."); Poveda, supra note 39, at 237
(noting that structuralist theory understands white-collar crime enforcement "as a symbolic way of
maintaining legitimacy" of a state and legal system that protects capitalism); id. at 247 (finding
that studies confirm that "the vast majority of offenders who are arrested for certain designated
'white-collar crime' statutes.., are overwhelmingly not elite offenders").
144.
See RICO Reform, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, 99th Cong. 491 (1987) [hereinafter RICO Reform] (A securities
industry representative notes: "The explosion of civil RICO cases stands in stark contrast to the
self-discipline imposed by the Justice Department in its employment of RICO in criminal prosecutions."); see also id. at 3 (stating that accountants are interested only in civil reform); id. at 191. A
lawyer for insurance groups noted:
In the hands of responsible prosecutors, those very broad statutes [mail, wire, and securities fraud] can be used with discretion in appropriate cases, but where private parties
lured by treble damages and attorneys' fees, and unrestrained by prosecutorial discretion,
can initiate private RICO actions based on allegations of fraud, there is no responsible
limitation on the claims that they can bring.
Id.; see MARION, supra note 68, at 208; Steven A. Holmes, Congress to Take New Look at Racketeering Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1990, at B18 (stating that a RICO reform bill, supported by lobbying efforts of "[ain unlikely coalition of business and labor groups and the American Civil
Liberties Union." "would leave intact the statute's criminal provisions"); cf. Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, tit. 1, § 107, 109 Stat. 758 (1995) (codified at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (Supp. 1998)) (barring the use of securities fraud predicate in civil RICO
actions, absent prior criminal conviction).
143.

CRIME: RATIONALITIES, COMMUNICATION, POWER
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STRUCTURAL AND PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS OF CONTROL

In other contexts, positive political theorists have noted Congress's
remarkable sophistication in designing administrative structures and processes to ensure that agencies "produce policy outcomes that legislators deem
satisfactory."'' 5 There is considerable room for debate on this point. If the
ostensible breadth of legislative delegation stems from Congress's inability
to formulate or agree on particular policy choices, it is a bit odd to suggest
that legislators somehow will "agree on structural and procedural arrangements that are sufficiently specific as to direct policy choices."'46
Nonetheless, inquiry into such mechanisms of legislative influence, even
control, can still advance our understanding of the federal criminal system.
An account of these mechanisms might help us assess the degree to which
the lack of statutory specificity is actually attributable to the challenges
of assembling majorities, as opposed to other factors, like the political pressures that make it hard for even a solid majority to fine-tune criminal legislation. Moreover, we would advance our understanding of the constraints
on executive power even if it turned out that these devices were being
deployed by a small subset of legislators at the behest of special interests.
The account offered here is impressionistic. It suggests, however, that Congress's influence on enforcement decisions is far greater than those whose
criticism of its delegation has been based on the absence of legislative
specificity have recognized.
A.

Appointments and Hearings

Some aspects of the "incentive system"' ' that legislators use to promote their enforcement preferences and priorities can hardly be called low
visibility. The process for selecting U.S. attorneys, for example, has long
been recognized as a means through which senators influence prosecutorial
behavior in their respective states-at least when they are members of
the president's party.'
Their power over the administration's choice of
145.
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 45, at 432; see Jonathan R. Macey,
Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93
(1992); Macey, supra note 5, at 671-72; Barry R. Weingast & Mark J.Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J.POL.

ECON. 765 (1983).
146.
ROBINSON, supra note 89, at 97-98.
147.
Weingast & Moran, supra note 145, at 769.
148.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 45.
When both senators belong to the other party, the department consults state party leaders and members of the House of Representatives on appointments. Although such individuals may be as important as senators to the president's political coalition, they lack
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nominee is far from absolute, but as James Eisenstein has noted, senatorial
courtesy "provides enough leverage to offset partially the resources of the
department so that a good deal of give-and-take bargaining occurs. '
Exactly how this process affects decision making in U.S. Attorneys'
Offices is difficult to determine. By backing a prospective appointee whose
enforcement priorities match her own, a senator can promote an agenda, or

protect a special interest, without directly intervening in cases. Her influence may extend even to appointees who do not share her priorities,

because allegiance to the source of one's preferment is often a safe strategy
for advancement.' These aspects of legislative power are chancy because
U.S. attorneys have been known to "proceed with cases that they know will
generate tremendous pressures and ruin their subsequent careers.''. What
this process does generally (though not always) ensure, however, is that U.S.
attorneys have firm roots in the local power structure and at least appreciate
the preferences of the special interests that dominate it.

The ability of legislators to influence prosecutorial policy making
through the appointment process extends beyond U.S. attorneys to the
attorney general and her division chiefs, who are all subject to Senate con-

firmation. There is a Kabuki aspect to most confirmation hearings,"2 but
they do give legislators an opportunity to apprise the nominee of their own

priorities, if not to impose them. " At least in recent years, the exercise has
probably not been an empty ritual, given the difficulties that the Clinton's
Administration's Justice Department nominees have faced in the Senate.

4

the power to block Senate confirmation of nominees and consequently exert less influence on appointments.
Id.
149.
Id. at 42.
150.
See id: at 206 ("Undoubtedly, politically astute men who owe their appointment and
allegiance to an influential individual shape their decisions on their own initiative with no communication whatsoever.").
151.
Id. at 205.
152.
For a sardonic description of the process, see ROBERT B. REICH, LOCKED IN THE
CABINET 37-41 (1997).
153.
See Senators Poised to Confirm Nominee to Long-Vacant Top Job in Criminal Division, 63
BNA CRIM. L. RPTR. 117 (1998) (describing concerns raised by senators during confirmation
hearings for James K. Robinson, the Clinton Administration's nominee for assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division).
154.
After Jo Ann Harris resigned on August 31, 1995, the position of assistant attorney
general for the Criminal Division remained open for almost three years, in part because of Republican opposition to Robert Litt, the Clinton Administration's first nominee for the job. See
id.; Sam Skolnik, DOJ's Robert Litt: Clinton Tool or GOP Scapegoat, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 10, 1998,
at 1; Editorial, Vacancy at Justice, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1997, at A24. The administration's difficulties in obtaining confirmation for its nominations to the Civil Rights Division have been in
the news often. See John M. Broder, Clinton, Softening Slap at Senate, Names "Acting" Civil Rights
Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at Al (nomination of Bill Lann Lee); Lynne Duke, Attorney
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Oversight hearings also give legislators in the relevant committees the
chance to impose costs if enforcers are insufficiently attentive to their concerns. Here, too, the solicitude that enforcers show to legislators is often
limited to the duration of the hearing itself."'5 The ability to shine the
spotlight on executive activities may confer an extraordinary degree of
power on legislators in the criminal area, however, because it challenges the
virtual monopoly that enforcers, by invoking investigative secrecy and privacy, usually can maintain over information concerning their activities.
Because the committee system gives a small subset of legislators the
power to force enforcement agencies to internalize the political costs of a
prosecution or nonprosecution strategy, the oversight process arguably
"enhances the likelihood of an outcome favoring special-interest groups
insofar as these are the natural objects of a legislator's bounty."'5' 6 Yet,
whether done in the service of special interests or the public at large, the
process undoubtedly has been used to deter or restrain enforcement in certain sensitive areas." 7 One has only to look at the recent hearings into IRS
abuses,' 8 or into the conduct of ATF and FBI agents at the Branch
Davidian compound in Waco.'59 Characteristically, these hearings focused
Named to Rights Post: Ex-NAACP Litigator Deval Patrick to Fill Long-Vacant Position, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 1994, at Al (nomination of Deval Patrick); Neil A. Lewis, Senate Democrats Urge Withdrawal of Rights Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1993, at Al (nomination of Lani Guinier).
155.
See HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU
CHIEFS 165 (1981) (noting that all the bureau chiefs in his study "were alert to the moods of
Congress, sensitive to the attitudes of their committees, and careful not to give offense even when
demands could not be fully met"); ROBINSON, supra note 89, at 98.
[Bleing stubborn does not necessarily entail being stupid about it. The FDA commissioner who has just been berated for his failings by Congressman John Dingell may or
may not change his ways, but he is unlikely to make a public show of defiance that would
only prolong the confrontation and possibly force the congressman to take more drastic
measures.
ROBINSON, supra note 89, at 98.
156.
ROBINSON, supra note 89, at 101.
157.
There are limits to legislators' power in this area. Suzanne Weaver found that chiefs of
the Antitrust Division were frequently able to "excuse ...themselves from discussing particular
case decisions in any detail," merely by noting that "these are prosecutorial matters to be held in
confidence." WEAVER, supra note 92, at 151.
Oversight hearings have also investigated instances of allegedly inappropriate prosecutorial
leniency, such as that involving E.F. Hutton in 1985-96. See WHITE COLLAR CRIME (E.F.
HUTTON): HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 99-1026, pt. 3, at
3 (1986); Nicholas M. Horrock, Prosecutor Denies U.S., Hutton Made Deal, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7,
1985, at Cl; see also Galacatos, supra note 90, at 612-28 (discussing hearings into the handling
of environmental prosecutions).
158.
See Albert B. Crenshaw, Senate Panel Told of IRS Abuses; Witnesses Allege Harassment,
Mistakes, Fabricated Evidence, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1997, at E3; David Cay Johnston, Senate
Committee Is Told of a Vast Range of Abuses by I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1998, at A16.
159.
See Activities of Fed. Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians, Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives and
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more on tactics than on targeting. In deference to widely shared notions
of prosecutorial independence-notions that also provide Congress with
political cover-legislators are quite reluctant explicitly to challenge exercises of prosecutorial discretion. The message on targeting was nonetheless
clear in these hearings because it is highly unlikely that the use of the same
tactics on, for instance, narcotics traffickers, would have triggered similar
scrutiny. When legislators want to put an enforcement agency in the spotlight in a more sustained and systematic way, they can also deploy investigators from the General Accounting Office (GAO), as they did following
the Waco hearings." Such audits can operate as a powerful restraint on
agency activity."'
Legislators also occasionally impose reporting requirements on the
department, which allow them to track caseload and other matters without
resorting to the hearing process.'62 While the effectiveness of such measures
as a monitoring tool is probably rather limited,'63 they are yet another powerful signal of legislative priorities. Statutory penalties are used as another
such symbol by legislators who apparently presume (like some theorists)'"
that prosecutors seek to maximize convictions weighted by sentence.'65
Nearly every congressional session in recent times has seen oversight
inquiries into criminal enforcement activities. Given the range of possibilities, however, the number is relatively small. This is as one would expect.

the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Int'l. Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Comm. on Gov't Reform and
Oversight, 104th Cong. (1996).
160.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-96-104, ALCOHOL, TOBACCO
AND FIREARMS:

ISSUES RELATED TO USE OF FORCE, DEALER

LICENSING,

AND DATA

RESTRICTIONS (1996).
161.
The same GAO report that examined ATF's use of force policies in the wake of the
Branch Davidian raid also looked into allegations that ATF's firearms enforcement policy had
reduced the number of licensed firearms dealers. See id. at 3.
162.
See 1997 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 24, 85 app. 11 (1998) (providing statistics on criminal
intellectual property crimes, pursuant to congressional mandate). Congress imposed a similar
reporting requirement for the first three years of its computer crime statute. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 1030(h) (1994).
163.
See Ruff, supra note 121, at 1227 ("[Rieporting provisions ... are often only sops to
those concerned about excessive delegation of decisionmaking authority to executive agencies.").

164.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
289, 295-96 (1983); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 JL. & ECON. 61, 63
(1971); see also Richman, supra note 61, at 982-83.
165.
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-845, pt. 1, at 11-12 (1986) (stating that creation of five- and
ten-year mandatory minimum drug sentences would create incentives for prosecutors to focus on
the most serious drug traffickers); VIZZARD, supra note 52, at 140-44 (noting that the effect of the
reduction of a firearms offense from a felony to a misdemeanor was to reduce the incentive of federal prosecutors to pursue such cases because they prefer not to charge petty offenses).
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As Berry Weingast and Mark Moran have noted: "Public hearings and
investigations are resource-intensive activities, so they will hardly be used
by congressmen for those policy areas that are operating smoothly (i.e.,
benefiting congressional clientele). Their real purpose is to police those
areas functioning poorly."'" The more effective the legislative controls on
agency behavior are, "the less often we should observe sanctions in the form
of congressional attention through hearings and investigations. ' Let us
turn then to these other controls.
B.

Budget Controls and Agency Structure

To what extent does Congress's power of the purse provide a source of
influence over criminal enforcement decision making? Here, as with oversight hearings, the inquiry is bedeviled by the problem of "observational
equivalence" noted by Weingast and Moran: The absence of any pattern of
punitive budget cuts can equally be evidence of bureaucratic power or of
congressional dominance.' 6 One might argue that Congress cannot easily
flex its appropriations muscle in the criminal area: Just as legislators find it
politically difficult to narrow the scope of criminal statutes that have been
"abused" by prosecutors, so would they risk being called "soft on crime"
if they reduced appropriations to enforcement agencies. The structural
organization of the enforcement bureaucracy, however, provides strong circumstantial evidence that Congress's budgetary powers operate as a powerful constraint in this area.
If one is looking to see how Congress can use its appropriations
authority to affect agency targeting decisions, the place to start is not the
FBI. This is not because the Bureau's political power makes it immune from
such efforts. 69 Historians are in fact only beginning to unravel the rich

166.

Weingast & Moran, supra note 145, at 768-69.

167.

Id.at 769.

168.
See id. at 767. Barry Weingast and Mark Moran note that both theories are "observationally equivalent," in the sense that
they lead to the same observations about the relationship between agencies and Congress
during periods of stable policy: (1) the lack of oversight hearings; (2) the infrequency of
congressional investigations and policy resolutions; (3) the perfunctory nature of confirmation hearings of agency heads; (4) the lack of ostensible congressional attention to or
knowledge about the ongoing operation and policy consequences of agency choice; and
(5) the superficiality of annual appropriations hearings.

Id.
169.
See, e.g., COMBATTING FRAUD, supra note 90, at 146-59 (criticizing FBI field office priorities and the improper allocations of staff in connection with the savings and loan investigations).
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interaction between the agency's most powerful director and legislators. As
James Q. Wilson has noted:
Part of the reason [the FBI under Hoover] achieved such substantial

freedom from criticism or threats to its resources or powers is that it
anticipated the needs and cultivated the support of key elected officials, chiefly congressmen. Those who were later to suggest that
somehow the Bureau had achieved its power by duping, ignoring, or
intimidating Congress have simply not read, or have misread, the
historical record. 7 °

The point is only that, of all the federal enforcement agencies, the FBI is
probably the one most insulated from these pressures.
Some of this insulation doubtless is rooted in history, deriving from the
public image that J. Edgar Hoover so assiduously cultivated.' Hoover's
legacy in this regard, however, proved less than enduring when, in the wake
of Watergate and COINTELPRO disclosures, "[t]he unchallenged prestige
of the FBI, the basis for its extraordinary autonomy, collapsed utterly," and
legislators vied for the chance to criticize and control the agency.' Their
concerns stemmed as much from discovering the extent to which the
Bureau had been responsive to the president's bidding, as from discovering
the degree to which it had infringed on civil liberties."' The long climb
back up to respectability and power that the Bureau has made since the
mid-1970s surely owes something to the agency's subsequent record and
leadership. Yet it also owes much to the nature and breadth of the Bureau's
jurisdiction, which extends to a number of areas that individually or in
combination are politically sacrosanct, such as counterintelligence, domestic terrorism, bank robbery, and organized crime.
There is, of course, some circularity here: The Bureau has jurisdiction
(often exclusive) in these areas because Congress granted it or, at least,
allowed it. But some federal agency had to have authority in each of these
areas, and, from legislators' perspective, the fewer such agencies, the better.
170.
WILSON, supra note 37, at 166.
171.
See POTTER, supra note 125; POWERS, supra note 70, at 196-214 (recounting Hoover's
efforts at image creation during the New Deal); WILSON, supra note 37, at 168 (noting that, in
the 1920s, "the Bureau earned the prestige that made every congressman both respectful of its
stature and eager to enhance it further").
172.
WILSON, supra note 37, at 180. Wilson notes that the Bureau's prestige and ability to
assert autonomy were so severely threatened that "[t]here was even a suggestion, unthinkable in
Hoover's time, that the Department of Justice might demand use of some of the parking spaces
beneath the new FBI headquarters building." Id.at 181.
173.
It should be remembered, however, that it was Hoover's refusal to make the Bureau an
instrument of Nixon's will that led the White House to create the "Plumbers." See 6 Hearings
Before the U.S. Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, 94th Cong., at 57-65 (1975); POWERS, supra note 70, at 469-70.
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And, having allowed the development of a single agency with these concerns, Congress has proceeded to use it as a precommitment device-one
that both conveys legislators' enthusiasm for enforcement in that area and
binds successors to a policy of relative noninterference. The same might be
said for the Secret Service, whose blue-chip portfolio of protection and
anticounterfeiting duties was recently expanded to include credit card and
computer fraud offenses. 4
This provisional presumption of the legislative intent behind such
jurisdictional decisions gains some support when one looks at other law
enforcement agencies. It cannot be a coincidence that in three areas in
which legislators have evinced the greatest ambivalence (at best) about
enforcement zeal-tax, immigration, and firearms-investigative authority
is exclusively confined in agencies with the narrowest of portfolios. As
usual, we cannot discount the role of historical accident here. Yet neither
can we discount the evidence that legislators use the organizational separation of enforcement functions as a means of political control-a way to
confine gatekeeper authority in a particular area to a single agency and to
ensure that the agency is amenable to legislative influence.
An exchange between then-Representative Charles Schumer and
Norman Rabkin, of the GAO, during recent hearings on the organization of
the federal law enforcement agencies is quite revealing:
Rep. Schumer: In terms of budget resources, we don't tell the FBI

how much of its resources go to healthcare fraud, how much of its
resources go to each specific area. They have pretty much freedom to
switch that among themselves so ... let us just assume the DEA were

folded into the FBI, we could [send] a lot of letters to an administration saying make sure you focus on drugs, but.., would we have that
much clout? In fact, when the agency's broken out is when we have

174.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1029(d) (1994) (giving the Secret Service authority to investigate
"access device" fraud); id. § 1030(d) (giving the Secret Service authority to investigate computer
fraud); VIZZARD, supra note 52, at 83 ("Because the Secret Service has a relatively small and noncontroversial law enforcement jurisdiction, the agency has little experience with hostile
congressional oversight."); id. at 201 ("[The Secret Service's] primary law enforcement function,
counterfeiting suppression, generates virtually no controversy or turf conflicts. The more predominant protection function is virtually immune from political attack and is afforded almost
unlimited resources and broad authority.").
The recent debate about whether Secret Service agents should be able to assert a special "protective privilege" to avoid giving testimony in Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's investigation-even though the agency did not prevail in the courts, see James Bennet, Clinton Guards
Begin Testimony in Starr Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1998, at Al; Stephen Labaton, Judges Turn
Down Justice Dept. in Bid to Block Agents' Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, at Al-was more
testament to the agency's power than its weakness. See Jacob M. Schlesinger, Secret Service's Code
of Silence May Be Tested by Starr, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1998, at A24.
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the budget authority issue because we can say this much for DEA;
this much for FBI. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Rabkin: You certainly can give it more visibility that way, but
once the caveats that are attached to the funds that are appropriated,
appropriation committees can direct the funds to be used in [I specific programs and through oversight or reprogramming rules keep
sight of where that money is actually spent.
Rep. Schumer: As chairman of the crime committee before my
esteemed colleague took over, I can tell you that we might be able to
say all the report language we want, have a hearing to do that, and
we don't have much say over it if it's not a separate agency. Believe
175
me.
The DEA's continued existence as a separate agency thus appears to be
testament to legislators' enthusiasm for drug enforcement. The preference
that other agencies be so separated, however, reflects a desire for restraint.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) has never been a particularly powerful agency on Capital Hill, to put it mildly." 6 In 1981, the
Reagan Administration, responding to years of lobbying, proposed that the
agency be eliminated. It appeared that the National Rifle Association
(NRA) had "scored a major victory."'7 Then the organization learned that
ATF's enforcement personnel and functions were to be assigned to the
Secret Service. ATF agents "welcomed the proposal as a means of ending
their perceived vulnerability to political attack from the firearms lobby.' 7 8
The NRA immediately rued its campaign, recognizing that the Secret
Service "might be a more vigorous enforcer and, given its positive public
image, less vulnerable to political attack."'179 The organization changed its
175.
Role of Federal Law Enforcement, Hearing of the Crime Subcomm. of the House Judiciary
Comm., Federal News Service, Nov. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
176.
One way ATF has responded to its political weakness is to work particularly hard at
assisting local enforcers. See VIZZARD, supra note 52, at 89 (observing that the agency's cooperative behavior "was born of a reality formed by ATF's lack of exclusive jurisdiction [instreet crime
and drug enforcement], limited resources, and weak political support"); Geller & Morris, supra
note 106, at 247 n.8 (noting ATF's reputation in this regard among local police).

177.

Helen Dewar, Treasury's Firearms Bureau Is Targeted for Elimination, WASH. POST,

Sept. 19, 1981, at A1; see Paul Taylor, Chief NRA Lobbyist's Ouster Seen, Triggered by Opposition to
Meese, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1982, at A4.
178.
VIZZARD, supra note 52, at 80.
179.
Taylor, supra note 177; see MARION, supra note 68, at 167-68; VIZZARD, supra note 52,
at 81. In the slightly partisan account of a retired ATF agent: "Congressional committees debated
the proposal until 1982 when the NRA, realizing that slaying the ATF beast would pit them
against the competent executives of the government's most prestigious service, hastened to revive
the crippled bureau. A compliant Senate supported the abrupt about-face. The proposal was
dead." JAMES MOORE, VERY SPECIAL AGENTS 239 (1997).
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position on consolidation, the measure died in the Senate, and the NRA's
chief lobbyist lost his job."s
ATF may also owe its continued existence, in part, to a quieter story of
agency capture. When ATF was broken out as a separate entity from the
IRS in 1972, the alcoholic beverage industry lobbied hard to ensure that its
regulation would fall within the new agency's bailiwick, "apparently
because [it] feared that a division charged only with alcohol regulation
could not maintain independence within the IRS."'' The industry's hopes
for a cooperative relationship with ATF were apparently fulfilled, and, in
1981, it championed the agency's cause."8 2
The immunity of the IRS from the influence of interest groups and
legislators acting either on their behalf or pursuant to a different political
agenda is only relative, however. And the separation of the Service's functions may reflect an effort to control it. Although congressional critics
have promised to end the IRS "as we know it," and there are arguments for
separating criminal and civil enforcement activities, 3 Congress has made
little effort to shift or spread the Service's criminal enforcement functions
among other agencies. A congressional critic even once proposed '"liberating' the bureau" from the Treasury Department in order to "make it more
responsive to" his committee.' 4 Similarly, while the Clinton Administration and many members of Congress have disagreed about whether the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) should be retained or
demolished, both sides agree that the INS's law enforcement functionsfrequently the subject of legislative scrutiny and criticism-should be
addressed by a dedicated bureau, not reassigned to any other existing
185
agency.
By thus configuring agency responsibilities to minimize the adverse
political fallout from an appropriations cut, Congress makes such cuts
unnecessary. Indeed, the senator who played a critical role in blocking
ATF's merger soon began to push for increases in the agency's budget."8
180.

See Taylor, supra note 177.
VIZZARD, supra note 52, at 12.
182.
See id. at 80. ATF's jurisdiction over arson investigations also "provided constituencies
in the form of the insurance industry and fire departments." Id. at 65.
183.
See DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 358
(1989) (proposing that the Criminal Investigation Division be removed from the IRS and established as a separate agency within the Treasury or Justice Department).
184.
KAUFMAN, supra note 155, at 162.
185.
See H.R. 3904, 105th Cong. (1998) (describing a bill sponsored by chair of House
appropriations subcommittee controlling INS funding that would have created a new Bureau for
Immigration Enforcement with the Department of Justice); Michael Higgins, Border War, A.B.A.
J., July 1998, 62, 62-66.
186.
See VIZZARD, supra note 52, at 87.
181.
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Once separated from the rest of the enforcement apparatus, an agency will
be particularly sensitive to congressional cues relating to targeting or to cues
from the special interests perceived as having influence on the Hill. Committing criminal enforcement of controversial laws to stand-alone agencies
with small portfolios also brings the dividend (from the perspective of legislators seeking restraint) of giving the agencies morale challenges that can
affect recruitment and tenure.
Strategies like these, which give politically vulnerable investigative
agencies exclusive or primary jurisdiction in certain areas, provide Congress
with a way to promote enforcement restraint without going through U.S.
Attorneys' Offices. This is just as well, because the historical independence
of U.S. Attorneys' Offices and the informality of their internal structures
make it hard for Congress to use any other structural mechanisms of control
outside Washington. When Congress wants to encourage U.S. Attorneys'
Offices to pursue certain kinds of cases, it can, and has, funded dedicated
slots in those offices. 87 But preventing an office from pursuing certain kinds
of cases is a far more difficult matter. The budgets of the component units
of an office's criminal division will not be amenable to easy legislative
manipulation because they are generally not separate budget lines and can
be created or merged without congressional authorization. As a result, the
areas in which Congress can most effectively influence prosecutorial choices
directly are those in which a unit in Main Justice-like the Civil Rights or
Antitrust Division-has exclusive authority (or approval power).
The claim is not that Congress actually creates small-portfolioed prosecutorial units in Main Justice so that it can better monitor their activities
through hearings and control them through appropriations. It is not even
that the executive creates such units as a bonding device to assure Congress
that it will tread carefully in a sensitive area. The historical record, for
example, makes quite clear that Attorney General Frank Murphy created
the Civil Rights Section of the Criminal Division in 1939 out of a
commitment to the enforcement of the criminal civil rights laws, not as an
instrument of restraint.'" The point is only that the effect of such a move
on prosecutorial accountability could hardly have been lost on legislators.'89
187.

See infra note 227.

188.
See BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 9 (1997). The section obtained division status in 1957, during the
Eisenhower Administration. See id. at 10; see also WEAVER, supra note 92, at 27 (suggesting that
the creation of the antitrust unit was a testament to Theodore Roosevelt's commitment to anti-

trust enforcement).
189.
See LANDSBERG, supra note 188, at 106 ("The decision to concentrate enforcement of
the civil rights laws in the Civil Rights Division rendered it easier to exercise the budgetary technique of ensuring adherence to priorities.").
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It certainly was not lost on the Justice Department, which effectively used
the recently created section's vulnerability as a sword when arguing for a
broad interpretation of the criminal civil rights statutes in Screws v. United
States. 9 This structural development, coupled with the requirement that
"all United States Attorneys ...submit cases ... for approval before prosecutions or investigations are instituted,"' 9' gave some bite to the government's claim that Congress would "supervise the Department's policies
and curb excesses [in civil rights prosecutions] by withdrawal of funds. ' 92
Since then, the relatively small number of criminal civil rights prosecutions
brought under these expansive statutes has much to do with the resource
allocations under which the division has long labored.' 93
In her insightful study of the Antitrust Division, Suzanne Weaver
found that Congress's "power of the purse seems rarely to be used to shape
division policies or decisions about resource allocation." '94 She noted that
on the rare occasions when the relevant subcommittee recommended cutting the division's appropriations, the move was usually justified by concerns, like inflation, "external to the performance of the division itself," and
that "subcommittee members have usually felt bound to appear in these
hearings as public partisans of the general goals of the division and of 'the
fine job the division does."" 9 Yet she also noted one analyst's suspicion
that the division's "self-restraint ...[was] due in part to a division perception that the general political climate would be hostile to large increases in
division activity."' 96
The evidence adduced here is concededly rather sketchy. It highlights, however, how any inquiry into the degree to which Congress uses
appropriations to control enforcement agencies cannot stop at asking
whether legislators actually make or even threaten budget cuts. The explicit
or tacit bargaining over enforcement power between the executive and
legislative branches is far more subtle. Whether used as a signalizing device
or as an actual mechanism for restraining enforcement activity, decisions
about organizational structure seem to be an important aspect of this
bargaining and seem to reflect a degree of legislative regulation of delegation not obvious in substantive federal criminal law.

190.
191.
192.
193.
sons of the
194.
195.
196.

325 U.S. 91 (1945).
Id. at 159 (Roberts, Frankfurter, Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 158.
See Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions:The LesRodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 561 (1994).
WEAVER, supra note 92, at 138.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 141 (comment of Office of Management and Budget budget examiner).
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C. Procedural and Investigative Limitations
Bill Stuntz has suggested that one reason Congress passes such broad
criminal statutes, particularly in areas in which defendants have the wherewithal to assert their rights, is to "make proof of guilt easier, which converts
otherwise contestable cases into guilty pleas, thereby avoiding most of the
costs criminal procedure creates."' 9' The relationship between substance
and procedure that Stuntz has so perceptively noted works both ways: Just
as Congress may expand the reach of substantive law to limit the costs of
procedural rules, so may it impose procedural costs or limit investigative
options to restrict the reach of substantive law.
Here too, some of the best evidence comes from the area of firearms
enforcement-perhaps because the political costs of explicitness are lowest
in this area. The Supreme Court recently had occasion to note the breadth
of the felon-in-possession statute, which makes it a crime, punishable by
imprisonment for up to ten years, for anyone previously convicted of a felony, whether state or federal, to possess a firearm.' 8 Although, particularly
after the Brady Bill, a great many criminals with prior felony records obtain
firearms through the unregulated secondary market, 99 numerous prosecutions could be brought under this statute if ATF simply did computer runs
comparing past firearms sales with criminal records registries. No such systematic program is possible, however, because Congress has prevented ATF
from creating a centralized computerized registry for various firearms records. Since fiscal year 1979, Congress has passed provisions prohibiting
ATF from using appropriated funds in connection with consolidating or
centralizing dealer records containing purchaser names."' 0 And in 1986, it
passed the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 0 ' which prohibits ATF from
197.
Stuntz, supra note 6, at 56; see also William J.Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the CivilCriminal Line, 7 J.CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996).
198.
See 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(g)(1) (1994); Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 655
(1997) (noting that the statute applies regardless of whether a defendant's prior felony was
"possession of short lobsters" or "the most aggravated murder"); see also Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 579 & n.1, 580 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the statute is
so broad that it reaches the bookkeeper who owns a hunting rifle, gets convicted of embezzlement,
and fails to relinquish possession); Richman, supra note 61, at 952-53, 980-81.
199. See JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A
SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 12-16 (1986) (noting that, in a sample of 1874
incarcerated felons, only 21% had obtained their most recent handgun from a customary retail
outlet, while 44% had obtained it from family or friends and 26% from gray and black market
sources); Philip J.
Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J.CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59 (1995).
200.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-174, FEDERAL FIREARMS LICEN-

SEE

DATA: ATF'S COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS 1 (1996) [hereinafter GAO

REPORT, FEDERAL FIREARMS].

201.

Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 107(a), 100 Stat. 460 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 926a).
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issuing any new regulations requiring that firearms licensee records be
recorded at or transferred to any government facility and bars the establishment of any new registration system for firearms, firearm owners, or
firearms transactions. In 1996, a House committee ordered a GAO audit
to ensure that ATF was complying with these directives."' Congress has
considered even broader agency-based procedural restraints as well: The
House bill that would have substantially relaxed the effects of the
exclusionary rule in federal prosecutions was careful to exclude seizures by
ATF and IRS from its purview.0 3
The House proposal highlights a general point. While the political
costs of narrowing the scope of substantive law appear to be prohibitive, the
costs of proposals to restrict enforcer activities are not, even when such
limitations disproportionately affect particular classes of cases or defendants.
This fact would explain the otherwise curious logic of some legislators after
the ABSCAM investigation ended with the conviction of several members
of Congress: Scrutiny and possible reform of the undercover tactics used
by law enforcement agencies in political corruption investigations was necessary, they explained, because such probes deal with crimes that are "somewhat vague." ' 4

Nothing approaching a comprehensive canvassing of Congress's forays
into procedural and investigative issues will be attempted here. The extent
to which these efforts influence, and are likely intended to influence,
enforcer priorities ought not be minimized, however. A recent move in
Congress to prevent federal prosecutors from avoiding ethical restrictions
on contacts with represented parties, for example, will tend to give special
insulation from investigation to individuals or entities with lawyers on
retainer.05 Interestingly, one of the leading backers of such legislation was
a representative whose suspicion of prosecutorial power stemmed, at least in
part, from having recently been the subject of bribery charges (on which he
was acquitted). 206
202.
See GAO REPORT, FEDERAL FIREARMS, supra note 200.
203.
See VIZZARD, supra note 52, at 202; Holly Idelson, House GOP Crime Bills Win Easy
Passage, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 456, 456-58 (1995).
204.
Katherine Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit
Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75, 111 n.127 (1987) (citing STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF REPORT ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS, 98th
Cong. (Comm. Print 1984)).
205.
See Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors § 801, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Star.
2681 (1998); Elkan Abramowitz, Ex Parte Contacts from the Justice Department, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 3,
1998, at 3.
206.
See T.R. Goldman, For McDade, Life Fuels Legislation, LEGAL TIMES, May 18, 1998,

802

46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 757 (1999)

For perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the difference between the
consideration legislators give to procedural or investigative proposals and
the consideration they give to substantive law, one need look only at the
legislative reaction to the Oklahoma City bombing. Although that crime
was certainly as atrocious and infamous as the outrages that have inspired
some of the greatest excesses of substantive federal lawmaking, 7 the
antiterrorism legislation offered in its wake by the Clinton Administration,
which focused more on investigative measures than on changes in substantive law, soon ran into severe difficulties in Congress. One casualty of the
debate was a provision that would have required manufacturers to make
black and smokeless powder with "taggants" that would help authorities
trace denoted explosives.08
D.

Approval Systems

Another sort of procedural restraint technically does not restrict executive authority but instead requires that Main Justice approve certain
prosecutions before they can proceed. Congress has resorted to these provisions on certain occasions when it is particularly concerned about
excessive prosecutorial zeal in a politically sensitive area. In order to ensure
that the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 would not be used against organized labor, for example, Congress provided that "[p]rosecutions under this
Act shall be commenced only upon the express direction of the Attorney
General of the United States."2 9 Such statutory approval requirements are
comparatively rare. However, that may be because the Justice Department
has itself imposed similar requirements through regulations in such diverse
areas as civil rights, RICO,"' and economic espionage prosecutions. The
Justice Department regularly cites these regulations to Congress (or to
207.
See supra pp. 772-73.
208.
See Thomas L. Friedman, House G.O.P. Madness, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at A15;
Jerry Gray, Republicans Weaken House Bill on Combating Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1996, at
L7; see also RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 5 n.* (1997) (questioning
"whether the response of right-wing members of Congress would have been different had the
paramilitary groups [targeted by the bill] been mainly black instead of mainly white").

209.

Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979 (1934). This provision was added in the House

of Representatives. See CRIME AND CRIMINAL PRACTICES, S. REP. NO. 75-1189, at 24 (1937).
Current statutes that mandate similar approvals from an assistant attorney general or higher
official include 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1994) (dealing with flight to avoid prosecution or giving testi-

mony) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1119, 2332 (addressing the murder of U.S. nationals abroad).
210.
See 7 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 117, § 9-110.320; MCGEE & DUFFY, supra
note 114, at 132-44 (discussing Paul Coffey's role in approving RICO cases); Paul E. Coffey,

The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1035 (1990).
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courts)21 as a guarantee that broad prosecutorial discretion will be exercised
prudently."' While U.S. Attorneys' Offices-particularly in the more independent districts-may not always abide by these departmental regulations, they surely constrain prosecutorial zeal, at least at the margin.
The theory behind these statutory and self-imposed restraints appears
to be largely the one articulated by Kahan in the context of statutory
interpretation:
Distant and largely invisible bureaucrats within the Justice Department lack the incentives that individual U.S. Attorneys have to
bend the law to serve purely local interests. In addition, the Department is more likely than are U.S. Attorneys to internalize the social
costs of bad readings. Because the Department, through the
President, is accountable to the national electorate, it is more likely
to be responsive to interests hurt by adventurous readings, particularly readings that discourage socially desirable market activities.
The Department also has much more reason to care about the impact
of such interpretations on the public fisc."'

Kahan's normative take on centralized prosecutorial authority is a
function of his tentative adoption of a highly partisan critique of the Wall
Street cases brought by Rudolph Giuliani's U.S. Attorney's Office in New
211.
See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 159 (1945) (Roberts, Frankfurter, Jackson,
JJ., dissenting) (quoting the Justice Department brief: "'To assure consistent observance of this
policy [of first encouraging state officials to take action] in the enforcement of the civil rights statutes, all United States Attorneys have been instructed to submit cases to the Department for
approval before prosecutions or investigations are instituted."'); see also 7 U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
supra note 117, § 9-110.320.
212.
See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S12,214 (1996) (Letter from Attorney General Janet Reno
to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch) (stating that the attorney general pledges to Congress that all prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Star. 3488 (1996)
(codified at 18 U.S.C §§ 1831-1832), in its first five years will have to be specifically approved by
herself, the deputy attorney general, or the assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division);
RICO Reform, supra note 144, at 261 (Deputy assistant attorney general for the Criminal Division
notes that, "Iblecause of RICO's potency, we have a special obligation to use the statute responsibly" and points to regulation that "[n]o RICO indictment may be filed unless it is approved by the
Organized Crime and Racketeering Section."); Galacatos, supra note 90, at 622-28 (recounting
changes in departmental approval policies for environmental cases).
It should be noted that the attorney general's promise that all prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 would be approved at the highest departmental levels came after an
earlier version of the bill that would have required such approval as a matter of statute. See H.R.
3723, 104th Cong. (1996) (version 6) (proposed § 1838).
213.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 66-67 (discussing the range of responses by U.S.
Attorneys' Offices to departmental directives); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 250 n.16
(1980); Kahan, supra note 4, at 486-87; Ruff, supra note 121, at 1207-08 (noting that, according
to a former Justice Department official, directives to U.S. Attorneys' Offices are "most often honored in the breach").
214.
Kahan, supra note 4, at 497.
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York in the mid-1980s. 115 Other stories would have produced different
paradigms. An account based on Main Justice's refusal to authorize the
prosecution of certain military contractors or financial services firms might
bewail the consequences of centralized authority overly responsive to the
national political process." 6 Reliance on stories from the Watergate era
would similarly highlight the dangers of centralization."' And an account
rooted in the record of the Kennedy Justice Department would see
insulation from local politics as a source of appropriate zeal, not moderation."8 Kahan is surely right, however, as a descriptive matter: For better or
worse, Main Justice is likely far more sensitive to the interests of geographically dispersed groups than is any U.S. Attorney's Office." 9
This sensitivity is in part a function of the relationship between the
department and the White House that Kahan notes. The political appointees at Main Justice owe their jobs to the president, and their subordinates
may be similarly inclined toward caution: Functionaries who intend to
make a career in the Washington bureaucracy may be far more protective of
departmental interests than prosecutors in the U.S. Attorneys' Offices with
eyes on private practice or local politics.2
Moreover, even under the
unlikely assumption that U.S. attorneys were as sensitive to the preferences
of their district's legislative contingent (or certain members thereof) as the
political leadership of the Justice Department is to the preferences of the
president, geographically dispersed special interests would still tend to do
215.
See id. at 487, 498 (relying on criticism of Giuliani in DANIEL R. FISCHEL, PAYBACK
98-127 (1995)).
216.
See STEWART, supra note 118, at 62-86 (relating the decision by Main Justice not to
prosecute executives at firms, including McDonnell Douglas, for violations of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act); see also Nicholas M. Horrock, When E.F. Hutton Talked, Did Justice Listen?, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 9, 1985, at C1 (recounting how the decision to prosecute only E.F. Hutton for a massive check-kiting scheme, and not individuals at the firm, followed lunch between the attorney
general and Hutton's chairman, and the subsequent transfer of the case from the U.S. Attorney's
Office to Main Justice).
217.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 209-10 ("The fact that Republican U.S. attorneys
indicted former Attorney General John Mitchell, Vice-President Spiro Agnew, and the Republican chairman in New Jersey illustrates that the current decentralization of the department insulates its branch offices from political potential pressures as well as reduces the capacity for
implementing uniform policy.").
218.
See VICTOR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE (1971).
219.
Giuliani's career may offer some evidence of these differing perspectives. The same
person who Kahan alleges was so blind to the social costs of prosecutions as U.S. attorney was,
when associate attorney general, criticized for aborting the prosecution of several McDonald
Douglas executives for overseas bribes. That case, Giuliani later explained, reflected a 'prejudice
against business."' Michael Winerip, High-Profile Prosecutor,N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 37.
220.
It would be interesting to compare data on how long Main Justice personnel serve and
where they go afterward to similar data for one or more U.S. Attorney's Office. However, I have
been unable to obtain this information.
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better in Washington. There, the costs of organization on a national level,
and the structures of Washington politics," promise a far more sympathetic
hearing than they would likely get were they to proceed district by district.
By enacting statutory approval requirements, or by encouraging Main
Justice to impose them administratively, legislators can restrain prosecutorial zeal, not just by adding an additional level of supervision whose only
impact will be to reduce the cases brought in a particular area, but by giving
that gatekeeping role to officials who are likely to be far more sensitive
to legislative (or executive) pressure on behalf of special interests-or to
political pressure from those interests directly. This mechanism-like its
more extreme version, the Main Justice division that itself brings all (or virtually all) the enforcement cases in an area, such as the Antitrust or Tax
Divisions-thus goes far in addressing the agency problems the decentralized U.S. attorney system creates.
E.

The Benefits of Dispersed Authority

The interesting question is not why legislators impose or welcome
approval requirements when they do. After all, when enforcer restraint is
the goal, these measures are pale, but arguably cheap, substitutes for legislative specificity. It is why legislators do not demand them more often, in
many other sensitive areas. Why is the Fraud Section not given more of a
say about what securities prosecutions are brought by the U.S. Attorneys'
Offices under the mail fraud statute? Although the FBI does steer cases
involving federal corruption to the Public Integrity Section-which has been
criticized for being all too restrained"2'-why has that section not been given
a general veto power over all corruption cases? An argument turning on the

221.
See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341.
[W]hile the states are more easily captured by relatively undifferentiated majoritarian
interests intent on suppressing small minorities, the federal government may be a more
likely subject of capture by a set of special minoritarian interests, precisely because the
majority interest of the national constituency is so large, diffuse, and enormously difficult
to organize.
Id. at 386; see Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 963 (1985) ("The
various organized economic and ideological factions have divided national power among themselves, parceling it out to individual bureaucratic and congressional committee fiefdoms.").
222.
See Susan Schmidt & Roberto Suro, Troubled from the Start: Basic Conflict Impeded Justice Probe of Fund-Raising, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1997, at Al. "Public Integrity is widely regarded
as one of the most bureaucratic outfits at Justice,' said a department official, 'but they work that
way for a reason.' A major justification for their style, this official and others said, is that it protects the department from accusations of partisanship." Id.
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expertise of Main Justice practitioners is as strong here, perhaps stronger,
than it is for RICO and civil rights cases. Why has it not carried the day?
Obviously, there is unlikely to be any single explanation for Congress's
approval of, or acquiescence in, this degree of decentralization. Legislators
might believe that approval requirements do not accomplish much, perhaps because the line prosecutors or case agents closest to the facts end up
dominating the decision-making process. Alternatively, legislators might
prefer maximal supervision by Main Justice, all things being equal, but find
the costs of such supervision prohibitive. The already large bureaucracy in
Washington would have to be increased significantly if it were to review a
large proportion of cases from the districts. The intangible costs would also
be high: The ability of U.S. Attorneys' Offices to recruit top-flight legal talent to work at less than private practice salaries may in part depend on the
degree of responsibility and independence that a U.S. attorney and her
assistants are allowed. Temporary political configurations may also figure
into the calculus: In a period of divided government, a Congress controlled
by one party might well prefer in the short term that power not be centralized in an executive controlled by the other party.
All of these factors may well play a part in Congress's acquiescence in
U.S. attorney independence. But another factor appears to dominate, and
to highlight the significance of those cases in which Congress imposes or
encourages approval requirements: As a general matter, legislators appear to
want decentralized prosecutorial authority, with all the loss of bureaucratic
restraint that such a system entails."' They sometimes say so explicitly, in
the context of a specific enforcement area, as in 1993, when Representative
Dingell, believing that the Environmental Crimes Section of the Environment and Natural Resources Division had inappropriately compromised a
number of cases against corporations and corporate officials, "strongly recommended ... shifting decision-making power away from Main Justice to
'
the local USAOs."224
Even when legislators have expressed dissatisfaction
with U.S. attorneys' policies in an area, as the House Committee on Government Operations did in 1988 when it castigated certain offices for failing
to give financial institution cases sufficient attention in the wake of the
savings and loan crisis, they have eschewed structural change. Their solu223.
Some administrations appear to want decentralization as well. See MCGEE & DUFFY,
supra note 114, at 23-24 (noting that, according to a report prepared by the Clinton transition
team, "[tihe Bush administration ... made a conscious effort to limit the [Criminal] division's role
and even went so far as to bring politically appointed U.S. attorneys from across the country to
manage programs at Main Justice").
224.
Galacatos, supra note 90, at 650. In August 1994, Attorney General Reno responded
to legislative pressure by shifting authority back to the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. See id. at 625.
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tion in a "particularly egregious" case was simply to call for "the Attorney
General or the Deputy Attorney General [to] summon the U.S. Attorney ... for consultations."2"5

Although Congress established a Financial

Institutions Fraud Unit in the Attorney General's Office and authorized the
attorney general to establish task forces for financial institutions," 6 these
moves merely supplemented activity in the U.S. Attorneys' Office without
increasing centralization. Indeed, most of the expenditures that Congress
authorized for financial institution prosecutions in 1991 through 1992 were
earmarked for the FBI and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices."
There is also considerable support for an across-the-board shift of
power. In 1996, for example, Congress capped the number of personnel
that could work in Main Justice, without similarly limiting hiring in U.S.
Attorneys' Offices.2 Some legislators would go further and have since
pro2 9
posed that personnel from Main Justice be transferred to the districts,
This legislative enthusiasm for decentralized, and less moderated,
prosecutorial power doubtless reflects some deep-seated political norms that
extend beyond the peculiar circumstances of federal prosecutorial authority. 230 After all, the entire American criminal justice system is characterized
by an almost instinctive embrace of fragmented authority, with the tensions
between police and prosecutors, attorneys general and district attorneys
usually seen as a virtue, rather than a vice."' And the ideal of locally based
law enforcement is embedded in the system as well, reflected in the prevalence of elected district attorneys, venue rules, and jury composition

COMBATTING FRAUD, supra note 90, at 146.
226.
See Bruce A. Green, After the Fall: The Criminal Law Enforcement Response to the S&L
Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. S155, S171 (1991).
225.

227.
See id. The congressional response to health care fraud appears similarly to rely on
activity in U.S. Attorneys' Offices. See H.R. 2584, 105th Cong. § 105 (1997) (proposing "Health
Care Fraud Prosecution Act of 1997," which authorizes appropriations only for the FBI, the
Department of Health and Human Services, and U.S. Attorneys' Offices, not Main Justice).
228.
See Timothy J. Burger, A Matter of Style, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 20, 1998, at 1.
229.
See H.R. REP. NO. 105-526, at § 151 (1998) (proposing the "Department of Justice
Appropriations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1999, 2000, and 2001," which would allow the
attorney general to appoint 200 new assistant U.S. attorneys from the ranks of Main Justice, with
each position in Washington terminated upon the appointment of its incumbent to a U.S. Attorney's Office).
230.
See SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAW: THE CASE
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS 196 (1996) ("[Tlhe more diverse the regulatory environment, the
broader the discretion agency personnel will require to enforce the law.").
231.
See Pizzi, supra note 34, at 1336-39; see also Mirjan Damalka, Structures of Authority and

Comparative CriminalProcedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 487-507 (1975).
232.
See JOHN M. DAWSON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

PROSECUTORS IN STATE

COURTS, 1992, at 2 (1993) (noting that more than 95% of state and local chief prosecutors are
elected); Pizzi, supra note 34, at 1342-44; Richman, supra note 61, at 961-63.
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doctrines. The U.S. attorney system thus offers federal legislators the neat
ability to criminalize conduct, with all the political advantages such
legislation entails, without rejecting the virtues of localism in criminal
enforcement.
The ideal of decentralized criminal enforcement, however, has
acquired a special power in the context of the federal system, in which even
legislators of the president's party see U.S. attorneys as providing a critical
counterweight to Washington politics. The independent performance of
U.S. Attorneys' Offices during the Watergate era, just as the department's
leadership appeared to have "succumbed to political pressures," reduced the
impetus for imposing more controls."' This appreciation of decentralized
authority continues, as evidenced in the recent history of the campaign
finance investigation. When Attorney General Reno-in an apparent
effort to give the investigation a nonpartisan cast without invoking the
Independent Counsel statute-brought in Charles LaBella, of the U.S.
Attorney's Office in San Diego and formerly of the Southern District of
New York office, to replace personnel from the Public Integrity Section,3
Republican legislators, after initial resistance, soon embraced his independent voice. There doubtless was some result-orientation in their reaction
because LaBella recommended the appointment of an independent counsel.
However, support for his efforts and parallel criticism for the conduct of the
Public Integrity Division in the investigation do not reflect just a belief that
the White House is less likely to control assistant U.S. attorneys, but also a
'
belief that they will generally be more zealous, not mere "bureaucrats."235
Viewed in this light, legislators' general support for the decentralization of
prosecutorial power could be quite public regarding-a rejection of the
cost-internalization advantages offered by Main Justice and an effort to

233.

EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 124-25.
234.
See Schmidt & Suro, supra note 222; Roberto Suro, "Crisis in Confidence" Prompted
Reno's Decision: Shake-Up of Campaign Finance Task Force Intended to Inject Aggressiveness into
Probe, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1997, at A1O ("By bringing in a top prosecutor and veteran FBI
agent from outside the main Justice building to supervise the investigation, Reno is trying to
'inject the task force with a more aggressive spirit,' an official said.").
It appears that LaBella's selection was largely at the instance of FBI Director Freeh. See
Johnston, infra note 252.
235.
See James Dao, Reno Defends Her Decision About Inquiry on Finances, N.Y. TIMES, May
4, 1998, at A16 ('She ought to pay more attention to the career prosecutors,' [Senator Hatch]
said, referring to Mr. LaBella and Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
who has also recommended the appointment of an outside prosecutor."); Don Van Natta, Jr.,

F.B.I. Chief Still Sees Need for Campaign Finance Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1998, at A1O
("Republican Congressional leaders said today that they were satisfied with the investigation's

recent pace .... ).
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minimize the influence of national or presidential politics on enforcement
decision making. 36
U.S. attorney independence can serve other legislative purposes as
well. It can, in the white-collar area, for instance, help insulate legislators
from allegations of excessive regulatory laxity. During the savings and loan
crisis, for example, legislators with an interest in convincing the public that
criminal wrongdoing, rather than "either bad legislation or inattention from
federal legislators" was responsible for the savings and loan failures,.37 found
it convenient not merely to create new criminal offenses and raise the penalties for bank frauds,23 but also to chastise a number of U.S. Attorneys'
Offices for insufficient zeal in pursuing such cases. 39 This criticism was said
to have cost at least one U.S attorney his job, when Texas Senator Phil
Gramm thereafter refused to recommend him for another term. 4 Here,
one sees the corollary of U.S. attorneys' independence: Main Justice, and
the administration generally, may not be disposed to provide political cover
to decision making it did not control. By promoting or acquiescing in
decentralized prosecutorial authority, Congress can, if necessary, distance
itself more easily from enforcement decisions than it could if enforcement
authority were centralized. The attorney general, after all, can fight back
far more effectively than can a beleaguered U.S. attorney."' The legislator
seeking not control over enforcement policy, but the freedom to loudly
second-guess it, might thus be a great supporter of U.S. attorneys'
independence.
As always, one is hard-pressed to discern the "real" story or stories
behind the apparent refusal of legislators to reduce the independence of
U.S. Attorneys' Offices.242 Moreover, a complete account of congressional
efforts to manipulate the relationship between these offices and Main Jus236.

See EPA's Criminal Enforcement Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and

Investigationsof the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong. 208 (1993). Representative Dingell notes the "perception that centralizing decision-making on environmental cases in
Washington, D.C., opens the door to special preference, influence peddling, and invites the use of
pressures and special privilege ... on behalf of the rich and powerful." Id.
Green, supra note 226, at S167.
237.

238.

See id.at S173-76.

See COMBATTING FRAUD, supra note 90, at 18, 141-46.
239.
See Gary Taylor, S&L Bar in Houston Braces for the Attack, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 28, 1991,
240.
at 8.
Cf. Posner, supra note 104, at 54 ("If an independent agency is less subject to presiden241.
tial direction than is the Attorney General, it is by the same token in a poorer position to enlist
presidential support.").

242.

See

MASHAW,

supra note 47, at 203 ("Interest group explanations of legislative,

bureaucratic and, even judicial outcomes have often been little more than examples of post hoc,
ergo propter hoc ('after that, therefore because of that') logical fallacies.").
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tice must also reckon with parallel moves tending to enhance Washington's
ability to set prosecutorial priorities for the districts. Even while expressing
a general preference for decentralized enforcement activity, for example,
Congress passed the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,243
which requires all federal agencies to establish and report on program
performance plans. A recent GAO report notes that this provision "reinforces the importance" of the attorney general's responsibility for ensuring
that "national law enforcement priorities are addressed appropriately" and
requires the department to do more to monitor whether those priorities are
being implemented in the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. 44 What the evidence
strongly suggests, however, is that Congress gives considerable attention to
the balance of power between Washington and the districts, and that its
failure to impose more approval requirements reflects, not apathy or thrift,
but a conscious selection of a particular equilibrium.
CONCLUSION

Having explored, albeit all too cursorily, the structural dynamics that
lie underneath the sweeping provisions of substantive federal criminal law,
let us now consider how those dynamics should color our assessment of, and
reaction to, statutory breadth. Some of the observations here support the
telling of a rather straightforward story: Driven by the political rewards of
symbolism and the high costs of legislative specificity to pass broad criminal
statutes, legislators nonetheless seek to reduce the effects of such breadth on
favored interest groups. This, they do through a variety of mechanisms-of
various degrees of visibility-including the appointment process, oversight
hearings, and manipulation of institutional structures. There is thus considerable evidence that legislators are well aware of how to constrain
enforcer discretion and are willing to do so when they deem it appropriate.
These mechanisms offer special advantages over statutory specificity because
they require less upfront effort, allow enforcers the freedom to respond to
local conditions and the infinite variety of criminal activity, and preserve the
symbolic, and deterrent, benefits of broad prohibitions.24
243.
Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Star. 285 (1993).
244.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 120, at 21.
245.
See Lynch, supra note 8, at 2138.
Most people want exactly what we now have: a system in which criminal prohibitions
can function as symbolic condemnation of behavior we seriously disapprove of, but without imposing severe sanctions on every ordinary law-abiding person who on occasion
indulges in it; in which criminal laws have sufficient flexibility that those who violate
core moral precepts cannot escape through loopholes in narrowly-crafted statutes ....
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The frequency with which legislators deploy these mechanisms, and
their efficacy, is difficult to determine. A kind of uncertainty principle
operates here. The examples of "low-visibility" controls referred to in this
Article actually were never particularly concealed. Had they been so, I
probably would not have found them. Nonetheless, the fact that most
deployments of control mechanisms discussed here tend to restrain
enforcement activity in areas-like firearms, immigration, and tax-in
which there is reasonably broad political support for restraint, leads one to
suspect that legislators may well use similar, but quieter, tools when
restraint would favor a more concentrated interest group. Part of the
answer to those who would claim, based on substantive law, that Congress
has utterly failed to restrain prosecutorial discretion is thus that the critics
are looking in the wrong place. In Congress's structuring of and interactions with the enforcement bureaucracy, one sees clear moves to influence
how law enforcement officials exercise delegated authority.
Even assuming that we know only a fraction of the instances in which
these tools are used, however, the explanatory power of this controlmechanism story is limited. It simply cannot explain legislators' willingness
to steer so much enforcement business to U.S. Attorneys' Offices and the
FBI, the institutions in the federal criminal bureaucracy that seem most
immune from political control-or, as Kahan would have it, least likely to
internalize the political cost of their decisions.246 The claim is not that legislators have no influence over these institutions, for surely they do. As a
comparative matter, though, enforcement authority delegated to these
institutions is least amenable to legislative control-save in the limited
sense each legislator will have some degree of influence over the U.S.
attorney-and perhaps the agency field offices 24-in her district.
To the extent that legislators want to ensure that federal law does not
infringe upon the interests of state and local enforcers in their traditional
spheres of concern, the absence of such control is not a barrier to broad

246.
Dramatic evidence of the FBI's perceived independence can be found in the readiness
of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and his staff to rely on FBI agents in their investigation,
while maintaining a more-than-arm's-length distance from Justice Department prosecutors. And
congressional outrage at a threat to the FBI's independence lay at the heart of the White House
Travel Office debacle, which involved allegedly improper contacts between the White House and
FBI officials. See COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM AND OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATION OF THE WHITE
HOUSE TRAVEL OFFICE FIRINGS AND RELATED MATTERS, H.R. REP. No. 104-849, at 3 (1996);
see also Editorial, Myopia at the White House: The F.B.I. Abused, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1993,

at A20.
247.
See WILSON, supra note 37, at 202 ("[Flield administrators are likely to have strong ties
to local authorities including, possibly, governors, congressmen, and police chiefs, and these alliances are disrupted only at the [central agency] executive's peril.").
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delegation because the informational advantages of those groups work
to ensure the cooperation of federal agencies. There are no such restraints
in many areas of great concern to other interest groups, however. And in
those areas, U.S. Attorneys' Offices-often way stations for lawyers seeking
to advance their careers with conspicuous litigation victories against well-

represented targets-are far more likely to be bastions of zeal rather than
restraint. Even if one does not take the "war" on white-collar crime to be a
challenge to entrenched economic interests, 248 it is still worth noting that
the movement within the Justice Department against white-collar crime

came from U.S. Attorneys' Offices, not Washington.249
If the enthusiasm that legislators have often shown for decentralization
does not reflect a strategy of straightforward legislative control, how can it
be explained? The critical fact here is that Main Justice represents not

merely a source of restraint, but also a tool of presidential power."' The
very tools that Congress can use to restrain enforcer activity have the

unfortunate effect of rendering enforcement more amenable to control by
the attorney general and, ultimately, the president. Unwilling or unable to
alter the legislative dynamic favoring sweeping substantive prohibitions,
Congress manages not the scope of the authority it delegates, but the locus
of that authority.25 ' By placing enforcement discretion in what, compara-

tively speaking, is a sort of "blind trust," legislators sacrifice much of their
own influence in order to limit the president's. Congress may not always

approve of the greater zeal that relatively independent entities like U.S.
Attorneys' Offices and the FBI bring to certain enforcement areas. But its
primary goal may well be to prevent the president's people from doing, and
being rewarded for doing, the "cost internalization" that Kahan thinks is so

248.
See supra note 143.
249.
See Poveda, supra note 39, at 246. It should be noted that, in making white-collar
crime a priority, Main Justice and the FBI were also responding to pressure from members of congress, who complained about the absence of an adequately funded and coordinated national strategy in this area. See id. at 244. This is a reminder that all legislative demands for increased
centralization do not necessarily reflect a desire for restraint.
250.
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 95, at 115 ("An astute career official in Washington ... observed that a U.S. attorney's ties to senators and local political figures gave him a sense
of independence. The president also appoints assistant attorneys general, but they have no political base upon which to anchor independence from the attorney general.").
251.
Congress's strategy here can be contrasted with the approach that, according to
Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, it may take to independent agencies generally. They suggest
that "Congress might make agencies independent not to create real independence, but in order to
diminish presidential authority over their operations precisely in the interest of subjecting those
agencies to the control of congressional committees." Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 112, at 115.
As a general matter, U.S. attorneys would seem to be far less amendable to legislative control than
Main Justice.
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sorely lacking from federal enforcement. This, as much as short-term
political gain, explains the zeal with which, for example, legislators on
occasion foment separation between the FBI and its supposed political
masters-as some have been doing with respect to the pending campaign
finance investigation. 2 What is lost in accountability..3 is, under this
analysis, gained in limiting the political uses to which these enforcement
assets can be put.5

At first blush, any effort to present the patchwork of legislative
constraints and acquiescence in the absence of restraints as evidence of
a legitimate congressional "strategy" smacks of naivet6. After all, there is
evidence that the oversight and budget process is generally controlled by a
handful of interested legislators. 5 Indeed, the comparatively low visibility
of many of the control mechanisms discussed here hardly gives one confidence that decisions about their deployment are the product of true legislative deliberation.
The problem with these objections is not that they are empirically
wrong, but that their normative relevance is questionable. After all, the
process of substantive criminal lawmaking in the federal system is hardly a
model of democratic accountability either. In the absence of a constitutional vision of what should be criminal, it would seem no more legitimate
to tinker with Congress's gatekeeping choices than it is to tinker with its
substantive legislation, for the two are really part of an integral whole. It
turns out that Congress is quite interested in who exercises the extra-

ordinary enforcement power it delegates. And before we consider reform
252.
See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Freeh Says Reno Clearly Misread Prosecutor Law, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 1998, at AI (noting that a Republican senator disclosed that FBI Director Freeh forcefully
warned Attorney General Reno that she was misreading the Independent Counsel statute). One
article recounts:
Early in his tenure without widespread Republican support, Mr. Freeh was criticized
sharply by lawmakers for allowing confidential personnel files to be released to a lowlevel White House aide. Under pressure, he was forced to rescind his promotion of Larry
Potts, a key figure in the Ruby Ridge disaster, to the bureau's No. 2 position. But that
criticism has abated in recent months since Mr. Freeh let it be known that he agreed
with the Republicans over appointing an independent counsel.
David Johnston, F.B.I.'s Chief Tries to Influence Reno, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at Al.
253.
While Jerry Mashaw has touted the virtues of administrative policy-making discretion,
his argument assumes a high degree of presidential control over the bureaucracy. See Jerry
L. Mashaw, Prodelegation:Why Administrators Should Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORG.
81, 81-82 (1985); see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 112, at 105-06.
254.
This analysis also suggests that there may be an inherent tension between legislators'
desire to use the IRS as a whipping boy, see supra p. 797, and their desire to prevent the White
House from using it as a tool of presidential policy. See BURNHAM, supra note 183, at 226-54
(recounting the instances in which the IRS's power was abused for political purposes).
255.
See ROBINSON, supra note 89, at 97-101.
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proposals-like guidelines or Chevronization-that would increase the
centralization of authority in the federal enforcement bureaucracy, we
should give Congress's political decisions in this regard as much respect as
we give its decisions to criminalize conduct in the first place.

